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IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM:
A REAPPRAISAL
PRATHEEPAN GULASEKARAM† & S. KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN‡
This Article identifies how the current spate of state and local regulation is
changing the way elected officials, scholars, courts, and the public think about the
constitutional dimensions of immigration law and governmental responsibility for
immigration enforcement. Reinvigorating the theoretical possibilities left open by
the Supreme Court in its 1875 Chy Lung v. Freeman decision, state and local officials characterize their laws as unavoidable responses to the policy problems they
face when they are squeezed between the challenges of unauthorized migration and
the federal government’s failure to fix a broken system. In the October 2012 term,
in Arizona v. United States, the Court addressed, but did not settle, the difficult
empirical, theoretical, and constitutional questions necessitated by these enactments
and their attendant justifications. Our empirical investigation, however, discovered
that most state and local immigration laws are not organic policy responses to
pressing demographic challenges. Instead, such laws are the product of a more
nuanced and politicized process in which demographic concerns are neither necessary nor sufficient factors and in which federal inactivity and subfederal activity are
related phenomena, fomented by the same actors. This Article focuses on the constitutional and theoretical implications of these processes: It presents an evidencebased theory of state and local policy proliferation; it cautions legal scholars to
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rethink functionalist accounts for the rise of such laws; and it advises courts to
reassess their use of traditional federalism frameworks to evaluate these subfederal
enactments.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, the legal landscape of
immigration has fundamentally changed as states and localities have
dramatically increased their proposal and passage of immigration
laws. Officials in these enacting jurisdictions offer two related explanations for this sudden policy proliferation. First, they claim that
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/
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recent federal legislative inaction on immigration creates a policy
vacuum that invites subfederal participation. Second, they claim they
are compelled to fill this legislative void because regional challenges
caused by unauthorized immigrants1—such as economic depression,
overcrowding, and crime—force their hand. Prominent legal scholars,
and even the Supreme Court, have accepted aspects of this two-tiered
rationalization.2 In this Article, we argue that this explanation for the
current era of immigration federalism is theoretically, legally, and
descriptively flawed. Moreover, these misconceptions have serious
consequences for the ways in which courts, scholars, and officials analyze and comprehend subfederal immigration regulation. This Article
reappraises the phenomenon and offers a necessary corrective.
Prior to the Civil War, states and localities were the primary regulators of immigration.3 After the outlawing of slavery, however, the
federal government became the dominant, if not exclusive, locus of
immigration power, and remained so for the subsequent 125 years. In
Chy Lung v. Freeman, an 1875 case, the Supreme Court established
the notion of federal exclusivity in the field of immigration, striking
down a California scheme that permitted state commissioners, at their
discretion, to exact a bond for certain arriving immigrants.4 This type
of subfederal immigration policy—state and local attempts to expel
undocumented immigrants and exercise core immigration functions—
is precisely the system that has developed today, with several states
and localities enacting immigration enforcement ordinances and laws
designed to discover and discourage the presence of undocumented
persons. We term this recent resurgence of subfederal legislative
activity “the new immigration federalism.”
To justify these contemporary subfederal policies, states and local
officials complain that the federal government has forsaken its constitutional and statutory responsibility to control unauthorized migration. In this view, states and localities are left with no choice but to
step into the void. For example, in signing Arizona’s E-Verify law,
then-Governor Janet Napolitano declared: “Immigration is a federal
responsibility, but I signed [the law] because it is now abundantly
clear that Congress finds itself incapable of coping with the
1 In this paper, we will mostly refer to the class of persons present in the United States
without lawful status as unauthorized or undocumented immigrants, except when intentionally referring to the statements or actions of those who use the terms “illegal aliens” or
“illegal immigrants.” Any reference to these persons is intended to refer to those who
either entered without inspection, or are otherwise out of status and unlawfully present.
2 See infra Part II.A.
3 See generally Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law
(1776–1875), COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993).
4 92 U.S. 275, 277 (1875).
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comprehensive immigration reforms our country needs.”5 This narrative of federal failure has become so ingrained that in his Arizona v.
United States dissent in 2012, Justice Scalia declared, without evidentiary citation:
Arizona bears the brunt of the country’s illegal immigration
problem. Its citizens feel themselves under siege by large numbers
of illegal immigrants who invade their property, strain their social
services, and even place their lives in jeopardy. Federal officials
have been unable to remedy the problem, and indeed have recently
shown that they are unwilling to do so.6

In this emerging conception, exemplified by the “mirror image”
legal defense advanced by states such as Arizona,7 subfederal legislation and enforcement is framed as vital to achieving adequate and
appropriate immigration enforcement, and merely mirrors the priorities espoused by Congress in existing legislation.8
This narrative of federal failure, however, is descriptively and
legally suspect. First, federal immigration law is not a blank slate; several sweeping enactments over the past decades, and more recent
budgetary authorizations, provide a comprehensive legislative background against which to assess claims of federal dalliance.9 Second,
the federal executive has been conspicuously active in immigration
policy, even if Congress has not produced new legislation.10 We argue
that it is necessary to consider both of these points to develop a
holistic understanding of the federal political branches’ roles in constituting federal immigration policy; at the very least, a complete understanding of the resource constraints and enforcement priorities that
5 Letter from Janet Napolitano, Governor of Ariz., to Jim Weiers, Speaker of the
House (July 7, 2007), available at http://www.countysupervisors.org/uploads/07-07-02%20
HB%202779%20Statement.pdf.
6 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2522 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
7 In 2010, Arizona passed S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010), enjoined in
part by Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012), a law designed to enhance state
immigration enforcement efforts by creating state immigration law crimes, and empowering state and local law enforcement officers to determine and report the legal status of
suspected undocumented persons.
8 Several defenses of subfederal immigration law—most notably Arizona’s defense of
S.B. 1070—advanced the “mirror image” theory, to wit: As long as state law relied on
federal immigration status definitions and pursued the same general goals of federal immigration law (identification and removal of unlawfully present persons), state immigration
enforcement schemes could coexist with federal schemes. The theory positions states as
“gap” or resource fillers in the overall immigration enforcement scheme, making up for
federal deficiencies by mirroring federal objectives. See Carissa Hessick, Mirror Image
Theory in State Immigration Regulation, SCOTUSBLOG (July 13, 2011, 2:34 PM), http://
www.scotusblog.com/2011/07/mirror-image-theory-in-state-immigration-regulation/; see
also infra notes 108–11 and accompanying text.
9 See infra Part III.A.1.
10 Id.
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constitute federal immigration policy complicates the concept of federal dalliance.
In addition to complaining about federal inaction, proponents of
subfederal immigration enforcement legislation also claim that their
immigration policies are critically necessary. According to subfederal
officials and immigration policy activists, federal failure has left states
and localities defenseless against the onslaught of difficult demographic problems caused by unlawful migration. According to many
restrictionist advocates,11 state and local immigration laws emerge as
compelled solutions to newfound and intractable policy challenges
such as economic stress, increased language isolation, wage depression, and overcrowded housing.12 For example, Alabama’s immigration law foregrounds in its statement of purpose that “[t]he State of
Alabama finds that illegal immigration is causing economic hardship
and lawlessness . . . .”13 Similarly, Lou Bartletta, the mayor of
Hazleton, a small city in central Pennsylvania that was among the earliest to pass a restrictive ordinance, testified to Congress that in
Hazleton, illegal immigration “is not some abstract debate about walls
and amnesty, but it is a tangible, very real problem.”14
While it might be tempting to dismiss these claims as the selfserving bluster of politicians and local legislatures, the assumptions
embedded in these factual claims have insinuated themselves into
judicial opinions and legal scholarship. Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion in Arizona, striking down three out of four provisions of
Arizona’s state immigration enforcement scheme, lamented the state’s
purported immigration woes, stating: “The pervasiveness of federal
regulation does not diminish the importance of immigration policy to
the States. Arizona bears many of the consequences of unlawful immigration.”15 In addition, some scholars argue for a functionalist understanding of local immigrant regulation, which maintains that the
11 We use the terms “restrictionist” and “restrictive” to describe the range of policy
positions arguing for greater immigration enforcement, increased state and local participation in enforcement, decreased ability of unlawfully present persons to access public goods,
and fewer discretionary decisions to permit unlawful presence.
12 See Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 (Sept. 21, 2006) (criminalizing hiring or harboring illegal immigrants); Lozano v. City of Hazleton, No. 07-3531, 2013 WL 3855549, at
*1 (3d Cir. July 26, 2013) (enjoining both the employment and housing provisions of the
city ordinance after reconsideration in light of Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S.
Ct. 1968 (2011), and Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012)).
13 H.B. 56, § 2, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011) (enacted and codified in part at ALA.
CODE § 31-13-2 (LexisNexis 2011)).
14 Comprehensive Immigration Reform: Examining the Need for a Guest Worker
Program: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 11-13 (2006) (statement of Louis Barletta, Mayor, Hazleton, Pa.).
15 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2500.
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demographic shifts caused by globalization and immigration “are felt
differently in different parts of the country, and the disruption immigration causes, as well as the viability of different immigration strategies, will vary.”16 Accordingly, divergent needs in localities validate
contrasting approaches to integrating and regulating the effects of
immigrants on local economies.17 Similarly, Professor Clare
Huntington writes that “changing immigration patterns . . . have
brought non-citizens to new parts of the country, . . . and to suburban
and rural areas. . . . [I]t is notable that the more punitive immigration
measures often, although not always, are enacted in areas new to
receiving significant populations of non-citizens.”18 Many media
reports have also invoked this same narrative of immigration-induced
changes leading inexorably to policy pressures and legislative action at
the local level.19
This necessity-based justification gives rise to several important
questions that require empirical verification.20 Are states like Arizona
and localities like Hazleton distinct in the quantity and quality of the
immigration problems they face? Are states like Indiana, Utah, and
South Carolina, or cities like Valley Park, Missouri, which have
16 Cristina M. Rodrı́guez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106
MICH. L. REV. 567, 609 (2008). To be clear, we are not suggesting that Professor Rodrı́guez
supports the efforts of jurisdictions like Arizona and Hazleton; our reference to her excellent work is limited to the assumptions undergirding her call for local action. Moreover, it
is important to clarify that Professor Rodrı́guez’s work on this point does not specifically
address S.B. 1070 or its copycat legislation; rather, her theory of local response deals with a
variety of integrationist policies at the subfederal level.
17 Id. at 594 (“Communities are also jumping on the enforcement bandwagon because
they seek control over their rapidly changing environments.”).
18 Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61
VAND. L. REV. 787, 806 (2008).
19 See, e.g., Alex Kotlowitz, Our Town, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 5, 2007, at 30, 33 (discussing various legislation passed to discourage illegal immigration); Ian Urbina & Maria
Newman, Virginia County Votes to Deny Services to Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
17, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/17/us/17prison-cnd.html?pagewanted=all
(describing a Virginia state panel’s rejection of a proposed state-run facility to hold
undocumented arrestees awaiting federal trial); Border States Deal with More Illegal
Immigrant Crime than Most, Data Suggest, FOX NEWS (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.foxnews.
com/politics/2010/04/29/border-states-dealing-illegal-immigrant-crime-data-suggests (discussing Arizona lawmakers’ claim that restrictionist immigration policies are the result of
increasing crime rates among illegal immigrant populations).
20 See Richard A. Posner, Justice Scalia Is Upset About Illegal Immigration. But Where
Is His Evidence?, SLATE, (June 27, 2012, 10:21 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_
and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2012/_supreme_court_year_in_review/supreme_
court_year_in_review_justice_scalia_offers_no_evidence_to_back_up_his_claims_about_
illegal_immigration_.html (critiquing Justice Scalia’s dissent in Arizona v. United States:
“[T]he suggestion that illegal immigrants in Arizona are . . . straining [Americans’] social
services, and even placing their lives in jeopardy is sufficiently inflammatory to call for a
citation to some reputable source of such hyperbole. Justice Scalia cites nothing to support
it.”).
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enacted laws similar to those in Arizona and Hazleton, also experiencing a rise in immigration-related concerns?21 Moreover, what
accounts for the lack of restrictive legislation in states and cities like
New Mexico and Atlanta—jurisdictions that have experienced the
same or even higher levels of demographic change as enacting jurisdictions? If demographic changes cause unwieldy public policy challenges, we might expect that several jurisdictions experiencing
population changes, language isolation, and economic stresses similar
to those of Alabama or Hazleton would be inclined to at least consider similar legislation. After all, in standard models of state and local
behavior, a jurisdiction’s successful policy experimentation should theoretically be considered or adopted by others facing common challenges.22 At the very least, the existence of such similarly situated, but
legislatively inert, localities merits a closer inquiry into the factors purportedly compelling some subfederal jurisdictions to enact immigration legislation.
Addressing these questions in empirical work, our findings cast
doubt on the factual premise undergirding the necessity of the new
immigration federalism. Our data and analysis show that, for the most
part, state and local immigration laws are not, as commonly assumed,
compelled responses tailored to regionally specific, immigrationinduced policy concerns.23 Our systemic, nationwide investigation of
recent subfederal immigration laws finds that demographic change
and attendant policy challenges are largely unrelated to the proposal
and passage of such laws. Instead, we uncover simpler, more consistent motivations: partisan opportunities and political entrepreneurship. Restrictive state and local immigration laws are largely the
product of interested policy advocates who promote such laws in

21

See infra Part II.B, note 296, & Appendices A–C.
See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (articulating “laboratories” of policy experimentation metaphor for varied state
and local action); Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Forced Federalism: States as Laboratories
of Immigration Reform, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1673, 1676 (2011); Rodrı́guez, supra note 16, at
571, 609.
23 See S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Tom Wong, Partisanship, Not Spanish: Explaining
Municipal Ordinances Affecting Undocumented Immigrants, in TAKING LOCAL CONTROL:
IMMIGRATION POLICY ACTIVISM IN U.S. CITIES AND STATES 73, 90 (Monica W. Varsanyi
ed., 2010) (suggesting that partisanship, rather than economic or cultural factors, influences
ordinances on immigration); S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, The
Importance of the Political in Immigration Federalism, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1431, 1436–45
(2012) (detailing how local partisanship explains the spread of restrictive immigration
laws). Undoubtedly, a particular enacting jurisdiction may in fact be experiencing a measurable and significant growth in its undocumented population and a correlated increase in
demographic concerns.
22
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politically receptive jurisdictions, regardless of the demographic concerns facing that jurisdiction.24
Our seemingly straightforward explanation profoundly influences
the manner in which elected officials, scholars, and courts should
understand and evaluate the new immigration federalism. Thus far,
these actors have mostly accepted the conventional explanation for
subfederal immigration regulation. By doing so, they have mischaracterized and misevaluated these laws in three ways. First, they
have incorrectly understood these enforcement-heavy subfederal laws
to be something other than state and local regulation of immigration.25 Second, they have credited, without evidence, traditional
tropes about regional variation and about the value of federalist policy
experimentation to solve demographic problems.26 Third, and finally,
their acceptance of the narrative of federal dalliance and subfederal
necessity has reified reliance on structural power frameworks to evaluate subfederal immigration lawmaking.27
Although providing a partisanship-based account for the rise and
spread of subfederal policy proliferation does not by itself suggest that
such lawmaking is illegitimate or unconstitutional, it should nudge
commentators and courts toward better analytic frameworks within
which to understand the phenomena. Combining original empirical
research with constitutional analysis, we argue:
(1) State and local immigration laws are part of an orchestrated
legislative cascade, mostly unrelated to underlying policy concerns
caused by unauthorized migration;
(2) the inherent structure of our federalist system creates a
dynamic feedback loop whereby subfederal immigration policies
hinder comprehensive federal reform efforts;
(3) dominant scholarly theories of immigration federalism must
be rethought because these subfederal laws are neither functional
responses to regional policy challenges nor isolated expressions of
anti-immigrant fervor; and
(4) the dubiousness of demographic claims, coupled with evidence of ethnic antipathy in the genesis of these laws, counsels in
favor of an equal protection framework rather than a preemption
framework to evaluate the recent spate of immigration lawmaking.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins by briefly
describing the history of state and local immigration regulation and
24 See Ramakrishnan & Wong, supra note 23, at 89 (suggesting that partisan composition impacts immigration law); Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, supra note 23, at 1475–80.
25 See infra notes 95–102 and accompanying text.
26 See infra Parts III.A.3 & III.B.1.
27 See infra Parts III.B.1–2.
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judicial responses to this regulation. In doing so, this Part articulates
the critical jurisprudential distinction between subfederal immigration
law and subfederal alienage law, providing a baseline against which to
compare and within which to analyze the new immigration federalism.
Part II elucidates a possible constitutional basis for the new immigration federalism, relying on the Supreme Court’s dicta in Chy Lung
regarding federal inaction and vital necessity. Despite this theoretical
possibility, the Article shows that the demographic concerns that
might justify subfederal immigration under a Chy Lung theory are
generally not salient in these enacting jurisdictions. Instead, we show
that partisanship is a highly salient factor influencing the proposal and
passage of restrictionist state and local laws.
Part III explores the implications of our empirical model. It first
presents our alternative, evidence-based version of causality in subfederal lawmaking: We show that both subfederal legislative action
and federal legislative inaction are galvanized by the same set of political actors and structural forces. We argue that the structure of our
federalist system ensures that subfederal policy proliferation inexorably gridlocks federal immigration lawmaking.28 In addition, we show
how this model of policy proliferation resembles a legislative cascade,29 thus undermining the dominant theoretical models that have
thus far sought to explain the phenomena.30 We conclude by assessing
the implications of our model of state and local policy proliferation for
judicial evaluation of the constitutionality of such laws.
28 See Larry D. Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1528
(1994) [hereinafter Kramer, Understanding Federalism] (detailing how the mutual dependency of party and elected officials at every level of government affects lawmaking); see
also Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000) [hereinafter Kramer, Political Safeguards of Federalism]
(arguing that the development of political parties has largely destroyed the distinction
between federal and state politics). We also argue, in other work, that congressional filibuster rules and targeted special-interest advocacy have played critical roles in stagnating
federal legislative efforts. See Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, supra note 23, at 1463–67
(providing examples of polarized federal lawmaking).
29 See Cass R. Sunstein & Timur Kuran, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999) (describing the role of political activists who capitalize on public
discourse and their potential influence in lawmaking).
30 See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 18, at 795–99 (describing the alleged federal dalliance in immigration legislation); Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The
Inherent Authority of Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179,
199–200, 230–34 (2006) (discussing states’ arrest authority as derived from state sovereign
power); Rodrı́guez, supra note 16, at 610–12 (discussing erosion of the federal exclusivity
principle); Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 57, 85–91 (2007) (noting that state immigration laws are not preempted if they track
federal goals); Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L.
REV. 1627, 1635–37 (1997) (discussing the virtues of a “steam-valve” theory of immigration
federalism).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\88-6\NYU603.txt

December 2013]

unknown

Seq: 10

IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM

25-NOV-13

12:34

2083

Of course, the Supreme Court and other federal courts have
recently enjoined many provisions of laws in Arizona,31 Georgia,32
Alabama,33 South Carolina,34 and Farmers Branch, Texas.35 Nevertheless, even after Arizona, other enforcement provisions and policies
intended to expel unlawful migrants have survived or continue to present judicial challenges.36 Some jurisdictions appear to be considering
new subfederal policies despite these rulings.37 Attempts to normalize
subfederal involvement merit close scrutiny as debates on the presence of unauthorized immigrants continues to permeate political and
legal discourse at all levels of government.
I
FEDERAL AND SUBFEDERAL IMMIGRATION AUTHORITY IN
HISTORICAL CONTEXT: IMMIGRATION LAW VERSUS ALIENAGE LAW
In order to understand the current legislative and judicial
dynamics of immigration federalism, we begin with an abridged
31 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (striking down three out of four
provisions of Arizona’s S.B. 1070).
32 Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Governor of Georgia, 691 F.3d 1250 (11th
Cir. 2012) (affirming most of the district court’s injunction of Georgia’s Illegal Immigration
Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011, but refusing to enjoin a provision which authorizes
investigation of immigration status under certain conditions).
33 United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1294 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 2022 (2013) (finding several provisions of Alabama’s H.B. 56 preempted, but not
enjoining provisions related to mandatory investigation of immigration status of certain
arrested individuals and individuals who may be driving without a valid license, nor a provision creating a state felony for unauthorized immigrants who attempt to obtain a business or driver’s license from the state).
34 United States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 518 (4th Cir. 2013) (affirming preliminary
injunction of three sections of the state immigration enforcement act).
35 Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, No. 10-10751, 2013 WL
3791664 (5th Cir. July 22, 2013) (en banc) (enjoining city’s occupancy license law, which
required proof of citizenship or lawful immigration status to rent property within the city).
36 See, e.g., United States v. South Carolina, 906 F. Supp. 2d 463, 470–73 (D.S.C. 2012),
aff’d, 720 F.3d 518, 533 (4th Cir. 2013) (dissolving preliminary injunction of certain
enforcement provisions of state enforcement law after reconsideration in light of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. United States); Robbie Brown, South Carolina:
Federal Court Delivers Mixed Verdict on Immigration Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2012,
at A24, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/us/south-carolina-federal-courtdelivers-mixed-verdict-on-immigration-measure.html; Keller v. City of Fremont, 719 F.3d
931, 941 (8th Cir. 2013) (upholding city ordinance requiring prospective residents to obtain
an occupancy license by identifying their immigration status); Emery P. Dalesio, NC
Immigration Panel Says Fed Should Do More, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 7, 2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2012-12-07/nc-immigration-panel-says-feds-should-domore.
37 See 2012 Immigration-Related Laws and Resolutions in the States (January 1–June 30,
2012), NAT’L CONFERENCE STATE LEGISLATURES (July 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issuesresearch/immig/2012-immigration-related-laws-and-resolutions.aspx (reporting bills and
resolutions passed or pending in the states in 2012).
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account of state and local participation in immigration regulation in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and explain the presumption of
federal exclusivity in the field of immigration law and enforcement. It
is this presumption of federal supremacy and exclusivity that contributes to “immigration exceptionalism” in our constitutional order, with
the judiciary granting significant deference to Congress when
reviewing immigration laws.38 In doing so, we also explicate the doctrinal difference between “immigration law,” in which the presumption of federal exclusivity applies robustly, and “alienage law,” in
which courts have permitted limited policymaking space for states and
localities. Establishing a historical baseline of immigration federalism
in this Part allows us to later identify precisely how the legal narrative
of subfederal regulation in our present era has developed to overcome
this default presumption and how that narrative is flawed.39
State and local participation in immigration regulation is not new.
Indeed, for most of the nation’s first century (from 1776 to 1875), the
only significant immigration laws were subfederal ones.40 The federal
government still dictated naturalization,41 but most controls over ports
of entry and regulations about fitness for presence within a jurisdiction were the product of state and local regulations.42 The predominant reason for this nineteenth-century state of affairs was slavery. In
many Southern states, federal immigration laws were viewed as a step
towards federal regulation of slave migration and the movement of
free blacks.43 As such, the first federal laws governing entry and exit
38 See Stephen H. Legomsky, Commentary, Immigration Exceptionalism: Commentary
on Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 307, 307 (2000) (“Under
[the plenary power doctrine], the Supreme Court has accorded exceptional deference to
Congress, often approaching non-reviewability, whenever there are issues concerning the
constitutionality of immigration legislation.”); cf. United States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d
518, 529 (4th Cir. 2013) (“We note that the presumption against preemption does not apply
here because immigration is an area traditionally regulated by the federal government.”).
39 As an important caveat, we should note that defending the constitutional soundness
and normative value of the presumption of federal exclusivity is beyond the scope of this
paper. For our present purposes, we simply note its development and existence in our
constitutional order.
40 See Neuman, supra note 3, at 1896–97 (noting the absence of a uniform federal
immigration policy prior to 1875).
41 See, e.g., An Act to Establish a Uniform Rule of Naturalization, 1 Stat. 103, Mar. 26,
1790 (repealed 1795).
42 See Neuman, supra note 3, at 1857–58 (listing state regulations on movement or
entry of persons).
43 Id. at 1866 (“Historians have reasonably suggested that a primary cause of the federal government’s failure to adopt qualitative restrictions on immigration before the Civil
War was the slave states’ jealous insistence on maintaining power over the movement of
free blacks as a states’ right.”).
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of aliens did not appear until after slavery was abolished as a matter of
federal constitutional principle.
Soon after the Civil War, the Supreme Court began laying the
foundation for exclusive federal control over immigration terms and
enforcement. In Chy Lung v. Freeman, the Court struck down a
California law allowing a state official, at his discretion, to exact a
bond for certain classes of arriving aliens, stating, “[t]he passage of
laws which concern the admission of citizens and subjects of foreign
nations to our shores belongs to Congress, and not to the States. . . .
[T]he responsibility for the character of those regulations, and for the
manner of their execution, belongs solely to the national government.”44 The Court’s methodology in Chy Lung would likely be considered something akin to structural or constitutional forms of
preemption, which invalidate the state law even in the absence of a
robust federal regulatory scheme like the modern-day Immigration
and Nationality Act, or a robust federal enforcement apparatus like
the Department of Homeland Security.45
In 1882, Congress began using this exclusive power in earnest
with the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act, widely recognized as
the nation’s first immigration law.46 That act, which barred immigration from China for a period of time, was renewed and extended in
subsequent federal enactments.47 The Supreme Court upheld the law
in Chae Chan Ping v. United States, again emphasizing the exclusive
federal power to control immigration terms and enforcement.48
44

92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875).
For discussion of a state law scrutinized for both structural and federal statutory
preemption, see infra notes 61–65 and accompanying text (discussing the district court
decision in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D.
Cal. 1995)); cf. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, No. 10-10751, 2013
WL 3791664, at *30 (5th Cir. July 22, 2013) (en banc) (Higginson, J., specially concurring)
(suggesting that the city’s rental ordinance may present dormant Commerce Clause issues);
Keller v. City of Fremont, 719 F.3d 931, 941 (8th Cir. 2013) (declining to enjoin city’s rental
ordinance and stating that “[l]aws designed to deter, or even prohibit, unlawfully present
aliens from residing within a particular locality are not tantamount to immigration laws
establishing who may enter or remain in the country” (emphasis omitted)).
46 Angela M. Banks, The Trouble with Treaties: Immigration and Judicial Review, 84
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1219, 1228 (2010).
47 Id. at 1228–29.
48 130 U.S. 581, 603–04 (1889) (“That [Congress] can exclude aliens from its territory is
[unquestionable]. . . . While under our Constitution and form of government the great mass
of local matters is controlled by local authorities, the United States, in their relation to
foreign countries and their subjects or citizens, are one nation . . . .”); see generally Gabriel
J. Chin, Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting: The Origins of Plenary Power, in
IMMIGRATION STORIES 7 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005) (discussing the
establishment of broad congressional power over deportation).
45

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\88-6\NYU603.txt

2086

unknown

Seq: 13

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

25-NOV-13

12:34

[Vol. 88:2074

Despite Chy Lung, Chae Chan Ping, and a third case, Fong Yue
Ting v. United States,49 throughout the twentieth century states and
localities continued to pass laws directed at immigrants, with the
related effect, if not purpose, of affecting immigration.50 The Supreme
Court appears to have divided these laws into two doctrinal categories. To the extent they attempt to control entry and exit, thereby
acting as “core” or “pure” immigration regulation, Chy Lung invalidates them, unless the enacting state can show both vital necessity and
federal inaction.51 To the extent that these regulations fall outside the
category of core immigration regulation, meaning they affect immigrants but do not directly dictate entry and exit, they may be considered “alienage” laws, to which the Supreme Court affords some
leeway for state and local governments to enact.52
In the realm of alienage law, the Supreme Court has upheld subfederal discrimination against noncitizens in areas that directly implicate a state’s sovereign functions and process of self-government, as in
the hiring of state police officers or teachers.53 Courts strike down
subfederal laws only when either federal law preempts them or the
49 149 U.S. 698, 727 (1893) (upholding as a valid exercise of Congress’s broad powers
over immigration a federal law permitting deportation of Chinese immigrants who could
not produce a certificate of residence or attestation to residency by “at least one credible
white witness”).
50 See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75, 80–81 (1979) (sustaining a New York
law barring aliens from teaching in public schools under the “governmental functions”
exception); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 370–71, 376–78 (1971) (striking down
Arizona welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship); Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 421–22 (1948) (striking down a California law denying aliens fishing
licenses); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (striking down a Pennsylvania alien
registration scheme); Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 396 (1927) (sustaining a law barring aliens from operating billiard halls as a public interest exception to
equal protection law); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39–42 (1915) (striking down an Arizona
law requiring eighty percent of employed persons in a business to be natural-born citizens
as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138,
145–46 (1914) (sustaining a state law barring aliens from hunting wild game).
51 See Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (holding that Congress has exclusive
power over immigration law, but providing, in dicta, that in certain circumstances states
may have the right to enact regulations affecting immigrants); see also infra notes 82–83
and accompanying text (discussing the vital necessity and federal inaction requirements).
52 This line, of course, is hard to draw and is theoretically suspect; every law that discriminates against noncitizens likely influences their choices to remain or leave. However,
the Court, at least in theory, suggests a doctrinal difference between the actual regulation
of entry, exit, and term and conditions of remaining, and all other state and local regulation
affecting noncitizens. For purposes of this Article, we accept the notion that there is “core”
immigration regulation that is solely federal in nature, and other types of regulation that
discriminate or otherwise affect noncitizens that do not directly affect entry, exit, or the
conditions of remaining.
53 See, e.g., Ambach, 441 U.S. at 80–81 (upholding New York law barring noncitizens
from public school teaching certification); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 294–300 (1978)
(upholding New York law barring noncitizens from working as state troopers).
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subfederal laws violate other substantive constitutional provisions. For
example, in De Canas v. Bica, the Court upheld a California law sanctioning employers for hiring unauthorized workers.54 In response to
De Canas, Congress restricted the ability of states to enact such laws
through the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986,
creating a federal employer-sanctions scheme and expressly preempting state laws. Similarly, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, an 1886 case, the
Court found a San Francisco regulation of laundries unconstitutional
on equal protection grounds because it was discriminatorily applied
against Chinese noncitizens.55
Aside from these limited allowances for subfederal alienage law,
state and local participation in immigration enforcement and deterrence is permitted only under the specific and narrowly defined circumstances established by the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA). Under the INA, states and localities may enter into conditioned and circumscribed cooperative enforcement agreements with
the federal government (termed 287(g) agreements),56 and they may
arrest individuals for specific immigration crimes (smuggling and harboring of unauthorized immigrants).57
While at least one commentator,58 one Office of Legal Counsel
memorandum,59 and one dissenting opinion in Arizona 60 have argued
that states and localities have inherent enforcement power, or at least
54

424 U.S. 351, 254–65 (1976).
118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).
56 It is worth noting that the federal government appears to be scaling back use of
287(g) agreements in favor of its Secure Communities program, which enables local
authorities to access federal databases to check the immigration status of persons in their
custody. See, e.g., Alan Gomez, Immigration Enforcement Program to Be Shut Down, USA
TODAY (Feb. 17, 2012, 3:25 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/201202-17/immigration-enforcement-program/53134284/1 (discussing Department of Homeland
Security plans to terminate some 287(g) agreements). Secure Communities, however, has
also faced significant opposition in large cities and states. See, e.g., Cristina Costantini &
Elise Foley, D.C. Passes Bill to Restrict Secure Communities Immigration Enforcement
Program, HUFFINGTON POST (July 10, 2012, 7:17 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/07/10/dc-immigration-law-secure-communities-ice_n_1663214.html (describing bill
that would limit local cooperation with federal immigration enforcement efforts).
57 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1323(a), 1324(a) (2012) (criminalizing smuggling and harboring of
unlawfully present persons).
58 Kobach, supra note 30, at 182.
59 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
Attorney Gen. John Ashcroft, Non-Preemption of the Authority of State and Local Law
Enforcement Officials to Arrest Aliens for Immigration Violations (Apr. 3, 2002), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/ACF27DA.pdf.
60 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2511 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“As a sovereign, Arizona has the inherent power to exclude persons from its territory, subject only to those limitations express in the Constitution or constitutionally imposed by Congress. That power to exclude has long been recognized as
inherent in sovereignty.”).
55
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greater power than contemplated by the INA, neither the Court nor
the overwhelming majority of immigration scholars has ever accepted
this position. For example, California’s attempt in the mid-1990s to
enact a state immigration enforcement scheme was struck down by a
federal district court in League of United Latin American Citizens v.
Wilson.61 That case is illustrative of the convergence of both immigration and alienage law analysis, as the district court analyzed the law
under both categorizations to enjoin most of California’s Proposition
187.62 Some of the scheme’s provisions, such as the use of a statecreated immigration status and the requirement that local officials
determine the immigration status of persons, report persons of
unlawful status to federal officials, and inform those persons of their
obligation to leave, were treated by the court as “immigration” laws
and therefore invalid.63 On the other hand, other provisions of
Proposition 187—those limiting educational access, for example—
were understood as “alienage” law and assessed using traditional preemption principles or equal protection analysis.64 A few such alienage
provisions survived the analysis, but most were enjoined.65
Moreover, the Supreme Court has consistently and overwhelmingly disapproved of state attempts to regulate immigration, discriminate against noncitizens, or discourage immigrant presence in a
particular locality.66 For example, states and localities may not
unequally enforce health and safety regulations,67 unilaterally deny
noncitizens public benefits68 (even if the federal government may do
61

908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
Id. at 774, 785–87 (finding that certain sections of law either were aimed at regulating immigration or contravened federal law).
63 Id. at 769–71. But see Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, No. CV12-02546 PHX
DGC, 2013 WL 2128315, at *10–11 (D. Ariz. May 16, 2013) (declining to enjoin the state’s
denial of driver’s licenses to recipients of the Obama administration’s Deferred Action for
Child Arrivals program and rejecting any reading of League of United Latin American
Citizens v. Wilson that suggests that the aspects of Proposition 187 were per se preempted
as establishing immigration law).
64 See League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 774.
65 See id. at 787 (enjoining provisions requiring school districts to verify student immigration status, denying education to undocumented students, and denying undocumented
persons access to federally funded benefits and services).
66 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (striking down Arizona welfare
law that discriminated on the basis of alienage); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280
(1875) (denying that states have the power to directly regulate immigration).
67 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374–75 (1886) (striking down the unequal
enforcement of a San Francisco laundry ordinance against noncitizen Chinese laundry
owners).
68 See Graham, 403 U.S. at 372. Note, however, that in the 1996 Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), Congress purported to allow
states to discriminate against noncitizens in the provision of certain types of public benefits. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1273–77.
62

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\88-6\NYU603.txt

December 2013]

unknown

Seq: 16

IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM

25-NOV-13

12:34

2089

so),69 nor deny undocumented children access to public education.70
Further illustrating this theme, in Hines v. Davidowitz, the Court
struck down Pennsylvania’s immigration enforcement scheme, which
included an alien registration system.71
In summary, from 1875 through the late 1990s, the Court and
Congress prohibited or severely curtailed the ability of states and
localities to regulate immigration, create enforcement schemes, and
deter the presence of unlawfully present persons. State efforts at
enacting “pure” immigration law were rebuffed beginning with Chy
Lung and rarely, if ever, attempted thereafter. Subfederal alienage
laws, as distinct from “pure” immigration laws, were also largely
struck down by the Court, although a handful of provisions have survived preemption and equal protection analysis. As a consequence,
before 2001, most legislative changes in immigration law occurred
though bipartisan national efforts, with comprehensive federal enactments passed in 1924,72 1952,73 1965,74 1986,75 and 1996.76
Given this background, the early twenty-first century’s resurgence of subfederal immigration regulation is striking, both in its
volume and in its defiance of the legal presumption against state and
69 See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976) (upholding alienage distinctions in federal government’s public benefits law).
70 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982).
71 312 U.S. 52, 68–75 (1941); see also Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The
Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of Immigration Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE
L.J. 251, 295 (2011) (“This is not the first time in American legal history that state attempts
to regulate immigration have been judicially rebuffed.”). Indeed, even when the Court
recently upheld Arizona’s E-Verify law, it did so because federal immigration law contained an express exception for the specific punishment created by the state, not because
states may unilaterally enact workplace enforcement laws. Chamber of Commerce v.
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1987 (2011). The Court relied on IRCA’s explicit non-preemption
of state “licensing laws” to uphold the Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA), which
requires businesses within the state to check their employees’ immigration status with the
federal e-verify database, lest those employers lose their license to do business in Arizona.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2012) (expressly preempting “any State or local law imposing
civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who
employ . . . unauthorized aliens”); Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1981 (“We hold that Arizona’s
licensing law falls well within the confines of the authority Congress chose to leave to the
States . . . .”).
72 Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153.
73 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163.
74 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911.
75 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359.
76 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1273–77; Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260–70; see also infra note
104; see generally THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP PROCESS AND POLICY 15–30 (7th ed. 2012) (providing a survey of federal
immigration enactments).
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local immigration regulation. The Supreme Court’s recent refusal to
enjoin all of Arizona’s S.B. 1070, and the persistence of similar laws in
Alabama,77 Georgia,78 Utah,79 and South Carolina,80 suggest that proponents of such laws have achieved some success in altering the presumptions that had appeared to be entrenched after Chy Lung. The
problem, however, is that the constitutional story upon which these
new laws are based is descriptively and theoretically flawed, as shown
below.

CHY LUNG

II
FLAWED BASES OF
IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM
AND THE

THE

NEW

As the abridged survey presented above shows, subfederal
attempts at immigration-related lawmaking are not new. The recent
proliferation of the trend, however, is surprising considering the consistent judicial rejection and limitations of such enactments. Perhaps
counterintuitively, then, in this new immigration federalism, states and
localities have attempted to justify their actions by reintroducing the
themes hinted at in Chy Lung, the Supreme Court’s foundational case
on state immigration authority. Recall that the case is still often cited
for the proposition that states have no business enacting separate
immigration schemes.81 However, in dicta, the Chy Lung Court
articulated a potential basis for subfederal immigration regulation:
We are not called upon by this statute to decide for or against the
right of a state, in the absence of legislation by Congress, to protect
herself by necessary and proper laws against paupers and convicted
criminals from abroad . . . . Such a right can only arise from a vital
necessity for its exercise, and cannot be carried beyond the scope of
that necessity.82

To address public policy problems, the Court thus inscribed into
doctrine two elements that theoretically justify state and local intervention in immigration: (1) federal legislative silence, and (2) absolute
necessity as long as the law is tailored to that necessity. The legal and
77 H.B. 56, § 2, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011) (enacted and codified in part at ALA.
CODE § 31-13-2 (LexisNexis 2011)).
78 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-5-100 (2013), enjoined in part, Georgia Latino Alliance for
Human Rights v. Governor of Georgia, 691 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2012).
79 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-9-1001–76-9-1009 (West 2013), enforcement stayed, Utah
Coal. of La Raza v. Herbert, No. 2:11–CV–401 CW, 2011 WL 7143098, at *1 (D. Utah May
11, 2011).
80 S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-13-480 (2012), held preempted, United States v. South
Carolina, 720 F.3d 518, 533 (2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-1100 (2012).
81 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
82 Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875).
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political narrative justifying the new immigration federalism implicitly
invokes—and is based on—these two factors.83
To be clear, states and localities have not expressly invoked Chy
Lung’s factors in their legal defenses. In fact, to the extent the case
has been cited in recent litigation over subfederal enactments, it has
been used mainly by challengers to establish traditional principles of
federal exclusivity,84 or by state-defendants attempting to distinguish
the case on its facts.85 In Graham v. Richardson,86 in which the Court
struck down a state welfare law that discriminated against noncitizens,
the challengers’ brief relied on Chy Lung to showcase the difficulty of
meeting the “vital necessity” standard.87 The Court, however, did not
rely on that rationale for its holding, instead treating the regulations
as alienage law, and consequently employing preemption and equal
protection grounds to invalidate the welfare law.88 Indeed, while often
citing Chy Lung to support federal exclusivity, federal courts have
rarely invoked Chy Lung’s potential to justify state immigration
action, sometimes noting the case obliquely, but generally choosing
alternate grounds for their decisions.89
As Professor Clare Huntington maintains, this reluctance to
openly engage Chy Lung’s possibilities could be because historically,
[there has] never been an occasion for the Court to explore the
second excerpt from Chy Lung, which left open the possibility that
states may have a role to play in pure immigration law. Indeed,
states and localities have not enacted pure immigration laws since
the end of the nineteenth century, and now the comprehensive INA
statutorily preempts such enactments. Absent a radical change in
83

See infra Parts II.A–II.B (elaborating on these factors).
See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 12,
Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (N.D. Ga. 2011)
(No. 1:11-CV-1804-TWT), 2011 WL 2438945 (citing Chy Lung for proposition that the
federal government has exclusive power over immigration because of the connection
between immigration and foreign relations).
85 See, e.g., Corrected Response Brief for Appellees and Principal Brief for CrossAppellants at 17, United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012) (Nos. 11-14532
& 11-14674), 2012 WL 263053 (arguing that the law at issue functioned differently than the
one in Chy Lung).
86 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (striking down Arizona and Pennsylvania statutes that restricted
noncitizens from accessing state welfare benefits on equal protection and federal power
grounds).
87 Brief for Appellees at 21, Sailer v. Leger (No. 727), consolidated on appeal with
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (No. 609), 1971 WL 133395 (“Pennsylvania has
raised no ‘vital necessity’ for regulating pauper aliens through differential operation of its
general assistance program . . . .” (citing Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 280)).
88 403 U.S. 365, 382–83 (1971).
89 See, e.g., Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10, 18, 23–24 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900) (using Chy
Lung, 92 U.S. 275, to describe the range of state power but relying on Yick Wo, 118 U.S.
356 (1886), to invalidate San Francisco’s quarantine law based on its unequal application).
84
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immigration law, we are unlikely to see any cases raising this
issue.90

Post-2001, however, and especially since 2005, states and localities
have created exactly such an occasion. Unlike subfederal laws
intended to curb noncitizens’ access to public benefits or specific types
of public employment, which might be characterized as alienage laws,
the new immigration federalism cuts to the core of immigration law.
With these laws, states have unilaterally decided who may remain
within their borders, with an eye towards discouraging the movement
of foreigners across the national border.91 In the words of Kris
Kobach,92 a former law professor who has served as legal counsel for
many states and localities that have passed restrictive legislation, both
in an individual capacity and as an employee of the Immigration
Reform Law Institute (IRLI), the legal branch of the restrictionist
advocacy group FAIR: “If we had a true nationwide policy of selfdeportation, I believe we would see our illegal alien population cut in
half at a minimum very quickly.”93 In other words, if enough states
were to enact restrictionist measures, unauthorized immigrants would
leave in large numbers.
As self-deportation is the avowed goal of these subfederal enactments, it is difficult to understand them as anything but attempts to
control exit and entry: The Arizona legislature unequivocally
expressed a purpose of causing “attrition through enforcement,”94 and
the Alabama legislature stated its intent to “discourage illegal immigration.”95 Further, federal courts have interpreted the rental,
90

Huntington, supra note 18, at 823.
See, e.g., United States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 518, 522 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Legislative supporters of the [state immigration law] said they hoped the bill would encourage
persons unlawfully present in South Carolina to find ‘a different state to go to . . . .’”
(quoting United States v. South Carolina, 840 F. Supp. 2d 898, 905 (D.S.C. 2011))); Villas
at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, No. 10-10751, 2013 WL 3791664, at *13
(5th Cir. July 22, 2013) (en banc) (Reavley, J., concurring in judgment) (“[T]he ordinance
does more than merely deter the presence of Latinos from Farmers Branch, and instead
works to exclude and remove aliens from the City’s borders. . . . Illegal aliens will therefore
have no recourse but to self-deport from Farmers Branch.”).
92 See infra notes 174–75 and accompanying text (discussing the leadership role Kobach
has played in fomenting a defense of subfederal immigration policy).
93 Jefferson Morley, The Man Behind Romney’s ‘Self-Deportation’ Plan, SALON (Feb.
22, 2012, 10:44 PM), http://www.salon.com/2012/02/22/the_man_behind_romneys_self_
deportation_dreams/ (quoting Kobach in his capacity as advisor to 2012 Republican presidential nominee Gov. Mitt Romney); see generally Kris W. Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule of
Law: What States Can and Should Do to Reduce Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
459, 468 (2008).
94 S.B. 1070, § 1, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010), enjoined in part by Arizona v.
United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
95 ALA. CODE § 31-13-2 (LexisNexis 2011).
91
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employment, contracting, and other enforcement aspects of these laws
as subfederal regulations of entry and exit. The Eleventh Circuit characterized the provision of Alabama’s law invalidating contracts
entered into by unauthorized immigrants as Alabama “craft[ing] a calculated policy of expulsion,” noting that the provision was a “thinly
veiled attempt to regulate immigration.”96 The Fourth Circuit97 and
various concurring opinions in the Fifth Circuit’s en banc enjoinment
of the Farmers Branch, Texas, rental ordinance suggested the same.
One such opinion stated: “I repeat what the [Fifth Circuit] panel said
about the Farmers Branch ordinance: Because the sole purpose and
effect of this ordinance is to target the presence of illegal aliens . . .
and to cause their removal, it contravenes the federal government’s
exclusive authority on the regulation of immigration . . . .”98
Despite articulating that contemporary subfederal laws were
intended as substitutes for federal immigration enforcement and
removal policy, these courts failed to comprehend the full import of
that observation. Only the Eleventh Circuit recognized the possibility
of structural preemption, reasoning with regards to the Alabama law’s
contracting provision that because the power to expel aliens from the
states “is retained only by the federal government, [the provision] is
preempted by the inherent power of the federal government to regulate immigration.”99 Even so, the court buttressed this conclusion by
also applying an alienage framework, finding statutory preemption by
detailing how the provision conflicted with the INA.100 Seemingly,
state regulation of entry and exit would call for the high constitutional
bar set by Chy Lung, under which these laws should be struck down
unless the enacting jurisdictions can show federal inaction and vital
necessity.
Inexplicably, despite the clear intent and focus of these laws,
courts and many commentators have continued to rely on an alienage
96

United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2012).
United States v. South Carolina, No. 12-1096, 2013 WL 3803464, at *8 (4th Cir. July
23, 2013) (upholding preliminary injunction of state law criminalizing, inter alia, possession
of counterfeit immigration documents).
98 Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, No. 10-10751, 2013 WL
3791664, at *15 (5th Cir. July 22, 2013) (en banc) (Reavley, J., concurring in judgment); see
also id. at *18 (Dennis, J., specially concurring) (noting that the Farmers Branch ordinance
“violates the principle that the removal process is entrusted to the discretion of the Federal
Government” by effectively excluding certain noncitizens from a part of “the United States
or the several states” (internal quotations omitted)).
99 Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1294.
100 Id. at 1294–96 (finding the contracting provision conflict preempted because
Congress intended the Attorney General to retain discretion over expulsion of removable
aliens).
97
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law framework and its concomitant preemption analysis.101 Despite
the mistaken legal analysis, the political narrative employed to defend
these policies suggests that states and local elected officials are keenly
aware that omnibus enforcement schemes—like S.B. 1070 or the
Hazleton ordinance—are, as the Eleventh Circuit assessed, regulations of core immigration functions.102 Such laws are necessary, the
narrative goes, to combat the existential threat caused by unlawful
migration and intensified by federal dalliance. Accordingly, this current era of immigration federalism bases its political and theoretical, if
not its legal, viability on a claim prefigured by Chy Lung: a crisis and
threat to sovereignty and an absence of federal legislation. In the following Subparts, we explore these claims in more detail.
A. Federal Inaction and the “Mirror Theory” Defense
Over the past several years, elected officials and advocates have
vociferously decried Congress’s legislative silence on immigration.
This federal inaction provides the normative space for state and local
involvement in immigration policy and enforcement, and has been a
part of nearly every elected official’s defense of their subfederal immigration regulations.103 Immigration, however, is not a blank slate:
Congress has enacted several comprehensive laws over the past century, including a major overhaul in 1996 comprised of the Illegal
101 See Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Governor of Georgia, 691 F.3d 1250,
1263–65 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding a section of the state law both field- and conflictpreempted); David S. Rubenstein, Immigration Structuralism: A Return to Form, 8 DUKE
J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 101, 140–43 (2013) (arguing that the Court treated S.B. 1070 as
an alienage law). We assess the impact of our analysis on preemption analysis infra Part
III.
102 See United States v. South Carolina, 840 F. Supp. 2d 898, 905–07 (D.S.C. 2011)
(recounting legislative statements and history in support of the state law), modified, 906 F.
Supp. 2d 463 (D.S.C. 2012), aff’d, 720 F.3d 815 (4th Cir. 2013); Governor Janice K. Brewer,
Press Release Accompanying the Signing of S.B. 1070 (Apr. 23, 2010), available at http://
azgovernor.gov/dms/upload/PR_042310_StatementByGovernorOnSB1070.pdf [hereinafter
Brewer, Statement on S.B. 1070]; Josh Gerstein, South Carolina Immigration Law Sparks
Suit from Justice Department, POLITICO (Oct. 31, 2011, 4:36 PM), http://www.politico.
com/news/stories/1011/67274.html (citing statements of South Carolina Governor Haley).
103 See, e.g., Brewer, Statement on S.B. 1070, supra note 102 (“We in Arizona have been
more than patient waiting for Washington to act. But decades of federal inaction . . . have
created a dangerous and unacceptable situation.”); Kim Chandler, Immigration Law Sponsors Say Issue Isn’t Going Away; Opponents Say It’s Time for Alabama to ‘Move On,’
AL.COM (Apr. 29, 2013, 6:05 PM), http://blog.al.com/wire/2013/04/alabama_immigration_
law_sponso.html (discussing a statement made by Republican State Senator Scott Beason
contending that “[t]he reason we have this problem is the federal government will not do
its job”); Valerie Richardson, Arizona’s AG: Court’s Ruling Is “A 70% Win,” WASH.
TIMES, June 25, 2012, at A4 (citing a remark by Democratic U.S. Senate candidate Richard
Carmona that “SB 1070 is the product of the federal government’s failure to act”).
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Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),104
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,105 and the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA).106 Since 2001, however, the political landscape of immigration law has changed dramatically, with several omnibus reform
efforts defeated in Congress.
Despite the significant amount of background federal legislation,
in contemporary evaluations of immigration federalism, states and
localities have successfully refocused the political and legal inquiry
when considering subfederal immigration measures on apparent congressional silence over the past ten to twelve years. In other words,
what has Congress done lately? Post-2001 Congress has considered
comprehensive federal immigration proposals and partial, stand-alone
proposals (such as the DREAM Act) several times without passage.
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Arizona v. United States noted this federal
legislative inactivity in response to rising unauthorized immigration,
suggesting that federal officials have been “unable to remedy the
problem” of unlawful migration affecting Arizona.107
In addition to highlighting federal idleness, defenders of subfederal action offer a “mirror theory” to defend state immigration regulation. This defense, proffered notably by Kris Kobach and the state
of Arizona, argues that subfederal immigration laws survive constitutional analysis because they mirror federal statutory dictates from past
comprehensive overhauls.108 According to the theory, state and local
immigration enforcement laws adopt the same goals and methods of
the federal statutory scheme109 and rely on the immigration categories
and definitions already inscribed in federal law;110 they merely
104 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009–546, 575–92 (1996) (expanding grounds for
removal, reducing judicial review of removal, reducing opportunities to seek relief from
removal, and expanding list of offenses with mandatory immigration detention).
105 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1273–77 (1996) (requiring the mandatory detention of noncitizens convicted of a range of offenses).
106 Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260–70 (1996) (limiting eligibility of noncitizens
for federal public benefits and purporting to authorize states to similarly restrict noncitizens’ access to certain public benefits).
107 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2522 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (referencing Arizona’s argument that the federal enforcement
efforts over the last decade had left Arizona’s border comparatively neglected).
108 For a full explanation of “mirror theory” and an excellent appraisal of its dubious
historical and constitutional footing, see Chin & Miller, supra note 71. See also Hessick,
supra note 8 (recounting the advice Kris Kobach provides to states that decide to enact
immigration regulations).
109 See Chin & Miller, supra note 71, at 259 (describing how states have the power to
enact laws as long as those laws are nearly identical to federal laws).
110 See Hessick, supra note 8 (“[T]he statute must not attempt to create any new categories of aliens not recognized by federal law.”).
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provide additional enforcement power to help supplement inadequate
federal efforts.111
Approximately eleven to fourteen million people are currently
unlawfully present in the United States (per the INA’s definitions of
unlawful presence),112 but only a fraction of these people have been
discovered, prosecuted, and deported.113 The gap between the number
of potentially removable persons and the number of persons actually
prosecuted and removed facilitates the claim that states and localities
must help the federal government fulfill legislative mandates.114
Under the mirror image theory, executive decisions to create enforcement priorities or to tolerate a certain level of unlawful migration are
not considered a part of federal immigration policy,115 and therefore
do not supplant subfederal regulations which might reduce this
level.116
While it is true that Congress has not passed any significant immigration regulations since 2001 and has not legislatively responded to
the recent spate of state and local enactments, claims of federal inaction are overbroad. First, Congress did pass border fence authorization in 2006,117 and (more significantly) passed budgetary
111 Professor Jessica Bulman-Pozen has characterized Arizona’s S.B. 1070 as an instance
of state “goading” that may help check federal executive power. Jessica Bulman-Pozen,
Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 484–86,
490 (2012) (“Arizona has similarly presented its bid to enforce federal immigration law as
vindicating congressional intent against an executive branch bent on underenforcing the
law.”).
112 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1227 (2012) (describing classes of “deportable aliens,”
including those who were inadmissible at the time of entry (for example, because of having
entered without inspection), those remaining after expiration of nonimmigrant visa
periods, and those violating the conditions of their nonimmigrant status).
113 See Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion that Matters, 58 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1819,
1828–29 (2011) (suggesting there is a chance of less than ten percent that an alien who
enters without inspection will be arrested in a given year).
114 See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2521 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“Of course there is no reason why the Federal Executive’s
need to allocate its scarce enforcement resources should disable Arizona from devoting its
resources to illegal immigration in Arizona . . . .”); Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The
Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 844 (2007) (discussing
the government’s failure to enforce existing immigration rules).
115 Reply Brief for Petitioners at 2, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2492 (No. 11-182), 2012 WL
1332574. We speak here of executive discretion in the broadest sense, including agency and
administrative decisions about priorities, deferred action programs, and individualized considerations in specific cases.
116 For a persuasive argument that executive enforcement decisions should have no preemptive effect, see Rubenstein, supra note 101. See also Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer,
No. CV12-02546 PHX DGC, 2013 WL 2128315, at *2, *7 (D. Ariz. May 16, 2013) (discussing Secretary Napolitano’s memorandum describing the administrative relief offered
as part of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program, and stating that “the memorandum does not have the force of law and cannot preempt state law or policy”).
117 See Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638.
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authorizations in 2010 and 2012 to fund enforcement efforts.118
Second, in the wake of congressional gridlock on broader immigration
reform, the federal executive has been conspicuously energetic, formulating enforcement priorities and pushing the limits of federal
enforcement capacity. Although Chy Lung specifically discussed congressional inaction (and not federal inaction generally), it was decided
at a time with little or no federal immigration policy of any kind. That
is, it did not contemplate the manner in which congressional and presidential oversight of immigration would evolve in tandem; the Court
could not have predicted the rise of the administrative state, including
agencies specifically tasked with managing and enforcing immigration
policy. Moreover, as the Chy Lung Court made clear, “the responsibility for the character of [immigration regulations] and for the
manner of their execution, belongs solely to the national government.”119 Accordingly, recent descriptive and theoretical models of
federal immigration policy advance a framework which considers
executive action in evaluating federal immigration actions and
policies.120
Indeed, a key distinction between the majority and dissents in
Arizona was their respective characterizations of the executive’s role
in defining federal immigration policy. The majority noted that a
“principal feature[ ]” of the removal system is the “broad discretion
exercised by immigration officials,” and that “[t]he dynamic nature of
relations with other countries requires the Executive Branch to ensure
that enforcement policies are consistent with this Nation’s foreign
policy.”121 In sharp contrast, Justice Scalia’s dissent dismissed the role
of executive discretion in defining the boundaries of federal immigration policy, responding that although state actors might not adopt federal enforcement priorities, “[t]he State has the sovereign power to
protect its borders more rigorously if it wishes, absent any valid

118 See, e.g., Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, H.R. 2892, 111th
Cong. (2010); Continuing Appropriations Act, H.R. 2017, 112th Cong. (2012).
119 Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) (emphasis added).
120 See Chin & Miller, supra note 71, at 299–304 (“There is no question that the president is entitled to execute federal immigration law just like all other federal laws.”); Adam
B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodrı́guez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458,
462 (2009) (“[I]n reality, the President has historically possessed tremendous power over
core immigrant screening policy through three channels: through claims of inherent executive authority; through formal mechanisms of congressional delegation; and through . . . de
facto delegation.”); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in
Immigration Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 244–45 (2010) (describing prosecutorial discretion as welcome and necessary in the area of immigration law).
121 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2495 (2012).
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federal prohibition. The Executive’s policy choice of lax enforcement
does not constitute such a prohibition.”122
Perhaps the most persuasive reason to doubt claims of federal
inaction is that Congress’s elaboration of the federal immigration code
gives the President significant control over removal decisions.123 For
example, the Eleventh Circuit focused on the essential role of executive discretion in defining the overall federal scheme in contrasting
that scheme with Georgia’s state immigration law:
By confining the prosecution of federal immigration crimes to federal court, Congress limited the power to pursue those cases to the
appropriate United States Attorney. As officers of the Executive
Branch, U.S. Attorneys for the most part exercise their discretion in
a manner consistent with the established enforcement priorities of
the Administration they serve. The terms of section 7, however, are
not conditioned on respect for the federal concerns or the priorities
that Congress has explicitly granted executive agencies the
authority to establish.124

Thus, rather than federal inaction, it is conscious policymaking,
including a consideration of costs and humanitarian concerns, that
limits the number of unauthorized immigrants removed each year.
This conclusion forecloses Chy Lung’s precondition that state
regulation exist in a federal vacuum and dispels the mirror image
122

Id. at 2517 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2012) (delegating to the Attorney General and other executive officers the power to administer and enforce provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act); Cox & Rodrı́guez, supra note 120, at 463 (detailing the tremendous
authority delegated to the President with regards to setting immigration screening policy);
Cristina M. Rodrı́guez, Constraint Through Delegation: The Case of Executive Control over
Immigration Policy, 59 DUKE L.J. 1787, 1789 (2010) (“[T]he [P]resident exercises . . .
power over core immigration policy as a de facto matter, albeit indirectly and in a manner
obscured from scrutiny, primarily through prosecutorial discretion or the use of discretionary enforcement power.”). Specifically concerning executive power and the Obama
administration’s recently instituted Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, see Letter from Professor Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA School of Law, on Behalf of
Immigration Law Professors, to President Obama (May 28, 2012), available at http://www.
nilc.org/document.html?id=754; Gary Endelman & Cyrus Mehta, Yes He Can, INSIGHTFUL
IMMIGR. BLOG (Oct. 28, 2012), http://blog.cyrusmehta.com/2012/10/yes-he-can-reply-toprofessors.html (detailing the President’s power regarding DACA).
124 Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Governor of Georgia, 691 F.3d 1250,
1265 (11th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted); see also Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp.
2d 477, 528, 537 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (holding that the city ordinance was unconstitutional and
opining that federal law struck a different enforcement balance than the city law), aff’d in
part, vacated in part, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated and remanded, 131 S. Ct. 2958
(2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, No. 07-3531, 2013 WL 3855549, at *1 (3d Cir. July 26,
2013) (enjoining both the employment and housing provisions of the city ordinance after
reconsideration in light of Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011), and
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012)); Cox & Posner, supra note 114, at 844–49
(discussing the role of discretion in immigration enforcement).
123
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defense.125 Congress’s regularly approved funding for immigration
prosecution and removal efforts limits the capacity of the enforcement
system to the deportation of a fraction of those who are unlawfully
present.126 Utilizing all available resources, immigration adjudicators,
and removal mechanisms available, DHS has been removing 400,000
noncitizens per year, a number which represents a historical high, yet
still only a small fraction of those unlawfully present in the United
States.127 Congress could choose to recruit and authorize state and
local enforcement authorities to help close the enforcement gap, but it
has elected not to do so. Instead, Congress has authorized state and
local immigration enforcement in specific and limited ways.128
In response to this claim, states and localities (and Justice Scalia
in his Arizona dissent) argue that federal resource constraints and
cost concerns can be mitigated by state and local participation in
enforcement of entry and exit provisions.129 This, however, ignores a
125 See Motomura, supra note 113, at 1831 (“For the much greater number of unauthorized migrants who simply remain unidentified, the low arrest rate partly reflects the level
of resources committed to apprehending unauthorized migrants. . . . INS funding would be
adequate to meet congressional enforcement mandates only with a seven-fold increase to
$46 billion.”); see also Cox & Rodrı́guez, supra note 120; Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Why a
Wall?, 2 U.C.I. L. REV. 147, 155 (2012) (noting the exorbitant cost of current borderfencing, which covers only 700 of over 2000 miles of southern border, and the continued
costs of repairing, maintaining, and monitoring the fence); Michael A. Olivas, Dreams
Deferred, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 463, 475 (2012) (noting that deferred action doctrine became established with the case of John Lennon in the 1970s); Rodrı́guez, supra
note 123, at 1798–99 (proffering that prosecutorial discretion is a part of the current immigration system because enforcement may be overwhelming the executive branch’s current
resources and because the executive may want to perpetuate low-cost labor or accommodate humanitarian concerns); Michael A. Olivas, The Dangers of Riding the Bus, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 1, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/08/01/isgetting-on-the-undocubus-a-good-idea/advice-to-immigrants-dont-get-on-the-undocubus.
126 See Motomura, supra note 113, at 1831 (noting the large number of unauthorized
migrants that remain unapprehended).
127 Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, on Civil Immigration Enforcement (June 30, 2010). At present, immigration
courts are backlogged at record levels, with 314,147 cases awaiting resolution as of July
2012. Elise Foley, Immigration Court Backlogs at Record High, Keeping Immigrants in
Limbo, HUFFINGTON POST (July 27, 2012, 4:36 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/
07/27/immigration-court-backlogs_n_1711505.html. To supplement existing removal mechanisms, DHS instituted the Secure Communities Program in 2008, requiring that all localities, pursuant to an express federal directive, share information about arrestees with ICE.
Secure Communities, ICE.GOV, http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ (last visited Aug.
27, 2013).
128 See Pratheepan Gulasekaram, No Exception to the Rule: The Unconstitutionality of
State Immigration Enforcement Laws, 5 ADVANCE: J. ACS ISSUE GROUPS, Fall 2011, at 37,
41 (“Rarely, sub-federal enactments have survived, but only when the state or locality has
regulated in an area of traditional state concern, and when the federal government had not
disapproved of state action.”).
129 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2521 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“Of course there is no reason why the Federal Executive’s need to
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fundamental reality of immigration law: Only the federal government
can prosecute removal actions, issue removal orders, detain removable immigrants, and physically effectuate removal. Thus, within this
scheme, states and localities are limited to arresting suspected
unlawful immigrants and holding them for short periods pending federal custody and action. Even this local action, however, is not costless
to the federal government,130 for any subfederal apprehension or
arrest of a suspected unlawful immigrant taxes federal resources and
removal systems. Viewed in this light, the federal political branches, in
combination, have created and instituted a system which enforces at
capacity yet concurrently tolerates a certain level of unlawful entry,
unlawful presence, and unauthorized employment.131 The increasing
number of subfederal laws today appear to be entry and exit restrictions in all but name and disrupt the workings of this system.
Along with resource constraints, selective federal immigration
enforcement reflects, in part, judgment on the part of Congress and
the executive that not every person eligible for prosecution and
deportation should in fact be placed in removal proceedings.132 The
executive can, for multiple policy reasons such as the country’s need
for labor, humanitarian reasons, or foreign policy reasons, elect to
limit enforcement of removal provisions for certain groups or persons.
Indeed, this long-established scheme of prioritized enforcement constitutes what Adam Cox and Eric Posner have deemed the “secondorder” structure of immigration regulation.133 In this conception,
Congress’s laws, which directly establish admissibility and
deportability for our “first-order” immigration structure, crudely
define who should be (and remain) a part of our national community.
These “first-order” laws, however, will never alone identify everyone
deserving to remain in the United States. Rather, it is a more nuanced
set of immigration enforcement decisions, requiring executive input
allocate its scarce enforcement resources should disable Arizona from devoting its
resources to illegal immigration in Arizona . . . .”).
130 Cf. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1986–87 (2011) (upholding
Arizona’s mandatory E-Verify law, relying, in part, on the attestation of the federal government that this type of state enforcement would not overly burden federal resources).
131 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.18 (“As the District Court observed . . .
the confluence of Government policies has resulted in ‘the existence of a large number of
employed illegal aliens . . . whose presence is tolerated, whose employment is perhaps even
welcomed . . . .’” (quoting Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 585 (E.D. Tex. 1978))).
132 See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499 (“Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law
embraces immediate human concerns.”).
133 Cox & Posner, supra note 114, at 844–49 (“Thus, the immigration agencies have
structured their enforcement priorities in a way that transforms a central part of American
immigration policy from a de jure ex ante screening system into a de facto ex post
screening system.”).
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and discretion, which allow for finer-grained post-entry judgments on
fitness to remain. These determinations together form the “second
order” of our enforcement scheme.
This descriptively robust version of federal immigration policy
contradicts the narrative of federal failure and stagnation necessary to
defend state and local immigration regulation. Not only does inclusion
of executive enforcement discretion complicate the story of federal
inaction, it also undermines the legal claim that subfederal enforcement schemes mirror and complement the federal scheme.134
Undoubtedly, this is not a consensus view.135 Professor David
Rubenstein, for example, offers a powerful critique of using executive
discretion as the basis for preempting subfederal enforcement prerogatives.136 And, Professor Bulman-Pozen characterizes S.B. 1070’s nonenjoined section 2 (requiring state officers to determine the federal
immigration status of arrestees)137 as “commandeer[ing] the federal
executive in a relatively limited way.”138 Leaving aside whether executive enforcement priorities should have preemptive effect, it is enough
for purposes of our analysis to note that the claim of federal dalliance
articulated by officials, advocates, and courts is a highly contested one
that does not comport with current budgetary realities and conspicuous executive activity. Moreover, together with our findings on the
demographic pressures facing enacting jurisdictions, it becomes clear
that the new immigration federalism fails to meet the constitutional
preconditions for state and local immigration regulation.
134 See Gulasekaram, supra note 128, at 37, 43 (discussing how states often argue their
subfederal immigration laws “mirror federal law and are therefore not preempted”);
Kobach, supra note 93, at 475–77 (detailing how states have attempted to create state-level
offenses that mirror federal law).
135 See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama
Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take
Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 795 (2013) (critiquing President Obama’s Deferred
Action for Child Arrivals program as an unconstitutional exercise of executive power). For
an argument that the administration’s program is well within the President’s executive
power, see Letter from Professor Hiroshi Motomura, supra note 123. For a critique of the
existing levels of prosecutorial discretion see Rodrı́guez, supra note 123, at 1796 (criticizing
the current immigration system as having “excessive prosecutorial discretion”).
136 Rubenstein, supra note 101, at 107–08 (noting the paradox in immigration law of
understanding executive discretion and policy priorities as “law” for preemption purposes,
but not for separation-of-powers purposes, and arguing that federal enforcement discretion
should not have a preemptive effect); see also Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, No. CV1202546 PHX DGC, 2013 WL 2128315, at *1 (D. Ariz. May 16, 2013) (ruling that the INA
delegates to the Secretary of Homeland Security “a form of prosecutorial discretion [to]
decide not to pursue the removal of a person unlawfully in the United States”).
137 S.B. 1070, § 2, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010), enjoined in part by Arizona v.
United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
138 Bulman-Pozen, supra note 111, at 485.
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B. “Vital Necessity” in State and Local Immigration Policies
As noted supra, “vital necessity” is the second requirement envisioned by Chy Lung for subfederal immigration law. Given the pervasive sentiment felt in media reports, statements of elected officials,
academic writing, and even judicial opinions, the claims of necessity
underlying much of the new immigration federalism should be quite
familiar. The key feature of this account is the assumption that subfederal immigration laws are organic policy responses to the uneven
and regionally specific challenges felt by localities with large numbers
of immigrants or those experiencing rapid increases in the rate of
immigration, especially of undocumented immigrants. Officials and
observers suggest that these immigration-related challenges include
economic depression, wage competition, overcrowded living conditions, language isolation, and crime.139 States like Alabama140 and
cities like Valley Park, Missouri assert these claims in the purpose
statements of their immigration ordinances:
Illegal immigration leads to higher crime rates, subjects our hospitals to fiscal hardship and our residents to substandard quality of
care, contributes to other burdens on public services, increasing
their costs and diminishing their availability, diminishes our overall
quality of life, and endangers the security and safety of the
homeland.141

Seeking to verify these claims, we tested the salience of several
factors hypothesized to induce state and local policy responses to
immigration. We ran regression analyses on two datasets: city-level
and state-level datasets that combine information on restrictive local
ordinance activity with demographic data and political contextual
data. As summarized below, our analysis of the data reveals that the
demographic factors commonly assumed to spur subfederal policy
responses are not useful in predicting or explaining the recent rise of
such regulations. Instead, our analysis reveals that, after controlling
for all other factors, political partisanship emerged as the most theoretically salient factor in explaining the spread of these laws. This
139 See, e.g., Asraa Mustufa, South Carolina’s Gov. Nikki Haley Makes Good on AntiImmigrant Promises, COLORLINES (June 30, 2011, 9:31 AM), http://colorlines.com/archives/
2011/06/south_carolina_governor_signs_anti-immigrant_bill_into_law.html (reporting
Senator Larry Grooms’s commentary that illegal immigrants “cling together in illegal communities and bring with them drugs, prostitution, violent crimes, gang activity”).
140 See ALA. CODE § 31-13-2 (LexisNexis 2011) (“The State of Alabama finds that
illegal immigration is causing economic hardship and lawlessness . . . . [T]he costs incurred
by school districts . . . can adversely affect the availability of public education resources to
students who are United States citizens . . . .”).
141 Valley Park, Mo., Ordinance No. 1736, § 2(C) (2007) (stating purpose of city’s illegal
immigrant employment and rental law).
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finding alone does not render these laws unconstitutional or even
unwise; it does, however, undermine the foundational narrative of the
new immigration federalism.
1. Hypothesized Factors Leading to Subfederal Policy Proposal and
Passage
We hypothesized that the following factors contribute to the proposal or passage of subfederal immigration regulation. We tested
these hypotheses using an original data set of about 25,000 cities142
and all fifty states. The hypothesized factors are: population of
undocumented immigrants, recent immigrants, and growth of Latino
and foreign-born populations;143 high proportions of linguistically isolated households;144 overcrowded housing;145 economic stress and
142 Our information on restrictive activity at the city level is based on lists collected by
various legal defense organizations, and validated by making phone calls to jurisdictions
noted as considering or passing ordinances, as well as by monitoring news stories on local
ordinances. We merged information on the proposal and passage of ordinances with census
data from the larger universe of over 25,000 cities. We ran a separate analysis involving
county subdivisions to account for townships and villages in many states, and find no significant difference in our findings on local partisanship and immigration-related factors. One
notable limitation of the county subdivision data is that immigration measures from 2000
(from the SF3 file) are publicly available only by place, not county subdivision. At the state
level, two graduate student research assistants coded legislative summaries provided by the
National Conference of State Legislatures based on their topic, valence, and severity. See
State Laws Related to Immigration and Immigrants, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/state-laws-related-toimmigration-and-immigrants.aspx (last visited Aug. 30, 2013) (providing annual legislative
summaries from 2005 to 2010). We also incorporated information on immigration-related
laws from FindLaw, a Thomson Reuters resource on cases and statutes, available at State
Immigration Laws, FINDLAW, http://immigration.findlaw.com/immigration-laws-andresources/state-immigration-laws/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2013). More information about our
datasets can be found in Appendix A.
143 In our state models, we rely on estimates from the Pew Research Center. PEW
RESEARCH CTR., UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION: NATIONAL AND STATE
TRENDS, 2010 (2011), available at http://www.pewhispanic.org/2011/02/01/unauthorizedimmigrant-population-brnational-and-state-trends-2010/. We do not have similar data at
the local level, so we instead use “recent immigrants” (the share of foreign-born who have
arrived since 2000) as a proxy measure, based on the fact that it is the variable most
strongly associated with the growth of the unauthorized population between 2000 and 2007
at the state level (r=0.50). U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2000 DECENNIAL CENSUS SF3 FILE,
YEAR OF ENTRY FOR THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION, tbl.P022; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
2005–2009 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 5-YEAR ESTIMATES, YEAR OF ENTRY BY
CITIZENSHIP STATUS IN THE UNITED STATES, tbl.B05005.
144 Measured as the proportion of Spanish-speaking households with no member who
speaks English at a proficiency level of “very well,” derived from the American
Community Survey. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2005–2009 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 5YEAR ESTIMATES, HOUSEHOLD LANGUAGE BY LINGUISTIC ISOLATION, tbl.B16002. This
variable is run separately from the overcrowding variable because the two variables have a
relatively high degree of collinearity (r=0.496).
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relative group deprivation;146 naturalized share of the citizen population;147 local economic interests;148 party composition of the electorate;149 and state-level policy climate.150
We could have added crime-related hypotheses to the list as well.
However, crime data are not available systematically across smaller
municipalities, and other factors in our analysis, such as localized poverty rates and overcrowded housing, are also related to the incidence
of crime. Furthermore, other researchers have tackled the question of
immigrants and criminality in great depth,151 and have consistently
found that the foreign-born are less likely to commit crimes than
native-born persons and that neighborhood contexts of increased

145 Measured as more than 1.5 persons per habitable room, derived from the American
Community Survey. The findings are similar when using the metric of one person per habitable room. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2005–2009 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 5-YEAR
ESTIMATES, TENURE BY OCCUPANTS PER ROOM, tbl.B25014.
146 Economic stress measured as the absolute proportion of White and Black residents
living below the poverty line; relative economic stress measured as the relative rate of
poverty of Whites and Blacks vis-à-vis Latinos, derived from the American Community
Survey. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2005–2009 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 5-YEAR
ESTIMATES, POVERTY STATUS IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS BY SEX, BY AGE, tbls. B17001B,
B17001H, B17001I.
147 Proportion of citizen population that is naturalized, derived from the American
Community Survey. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2005–2009 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 5YEAR ESTIMATES, SEX BY AGE BY CITIZENSHIP STATUS, tbl.B05003.
148 Measured as the proportion of workers in the jurisdiction that are employed in the
agriculture and construction industries, respectively—derived from the American
Community Survey. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2005–2009 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 5YEAR ESTIMATES, INDUSTRY BY OCCUPATION FOR THE CIVILIAN EMPLOYED POPULATION
16 YEARS AND OVER, tbl.S2405.
149 Measured as the proportion of voters for George Bush over John Kerry in 2004, with
party majority in the geographic area as an alternative measure. See Anthony C. Robinson,
Geovisualization of the 2004 Presidential Election, PENN. ST. U., http://www.personal.psu.
edu/users/a/c/acr181/election.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2013). We use presidential voting
data because party registration data is not available systematically at the local level across
all 50 states. In order to avoid the possibility of reverse-causality (of local immigration
opinion on ordinances driving presidential voting preferences), we use the most proximate
data prior to the rise of restrictive local ordinances starting in 2005.
150 In our city-level dataset, we use our state-level measure of restrictive or permissive
legislation as an explanatory factor. For more details on our coding procedures of state
laws, see Appendix B.
151 See generally, e.g., KRISTIN F. BUTCHER & ANNE MORRISON PIEHL, FED. RES. BANK
CHICAGO, WHY ARE IMMIGRANTS’ INCARCERATION RATES SO LOW? (2005), available at
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/working_papers/2005/wp2005_19.pdf;
Robert J. Sampson, Rethinking Crime and Immigration, CONTEXTS, Winter 2008, at 28,
28–33; Rubén G. Rumbaut et al., Debunking the Myth of Immigrant Criminality,
MIGRATION INFORMATION SOURCE (June 1, 2006), available at http://www.migration
inoformation.org/usfocus/display.cfm?ID=403.
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immigration and concentrated immigration actually lead to greater
declines in violent crime.152
Our primary finding, presented below and in Appendix B, is that
the commonly cited and assumed demographic factors listed as our
hypotheses above are generally not salient in determining whether or
not a given state or locality will propose or pass an immigration
policy.153 One factor, however—political partisanship—did remain
consistently salient in this inquiry after controlling for demographic
explanations. A more detailed look at our data and methods is
included in Appendix A.
2. Data and Statistical Findings
Among municipalities that passed restrictive ordinances, new
immigrants averaged about 3% of the total resident population,
slightly higher than the 1% average for municipalities across the
country.154 It is important to recognize that, while arguments for
restrictive legislation at the local level are often couched in terms of
massive policy challenges from new patterns in immigration, the magnitude of these changes in enacting jurisdictions suggest that the policy
problems engendered by new immigration are related more to perceptions of racial threat among local populations than to any characteristics of the newly arriving populations.155 Even if a level of new
immigration that averages 3% in enacting jurisdictions is viewed as an
objective basis for restrictive immigration laws, statistical analysis controlling for various other factors reveals that changes in the
152 See, e.g., Rubén G. Rumbaut, Professor of Sociology, U.C. Irvine, Presentation to
the Police Foundation National Conference on The Role of Local Police: Striking a
Balance Between Immigration Enforcement and Civil Liberties: Undocumented
Immigration and Rates of Crime and Imprisonment: Popular Myths and Empirical
Realities, (Aug. 21–22, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1877365 (showing
empirical evidence that immigrants, including illegal immigrants, are less likely to commit
violent crimes); Sampson, supra note 151.
153 As discussed in the following subsection, the number of Spanish-dominant households was also a salient factor, but this had a much smaller effect on the data.
154 These figures are means (averages). We use data from the 2000 Census, given
missing data in the 2005–2009 American Community Survey file. The corresponding
median figures are 1.72% for restrictive ordinance cities, and 0.16% for cities in the nation
as a whole. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2000 DECENNIAL CENSUS SF3 FILE, YEAR OF ENTRY
FOR THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION, tbl.P022.
155 This is in line with various strands of the racial threat literature, where the arrival of
even a few nonwhites, and misperception of the size and growth of minority populations,
fuel racially conservative attitudes. See Daniel Herda, How Many Immigrants? ForeignBorn Population Innumeracy in Europe, 74 PUB. OPINION Q. 674, 676–78 (2010) (detailing
how individuals often misperceive immigrant population sizes); Cara J. Wong, “Little” and
“Big” Pictures in Our Heads: Race, Local Context, and Innumeracy About Racial Groups
in the United States, 71 PUB. OPINION Q. 392, 395–99 (2007) (reporting that all races overestimate the presence of minority groups).
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proportion of foreign-born populations are not related to the passage
of local legislation.156
Indeed, the only immigration-related factor that bears a significant relationship to restrictionist legislation at the local level is the
proportion of Spanish-dominant households in the locality. Importantly, this variable is not necessarily related to immigration status and
cannot be used as a proxy for unlawful migration. Furthermore, the
effects of this variable are much smaller than the political effects we
uncovered: the share of Republican voters in the county, and the
importance of agricultural interests in the local economy. At the state
level, political factors are the only ones significantly related to the passage of restrictive legislation (that is, restrictionist laws are more likely
in Republican-heavy states and less likely in states with sizable agricultural interests). Consistent with data at the local level, growth of
the unauthorized population is unrelated to the passage of state-level
restrictive legislation.157
Chy Lung’s “vital necessity” prong might be understood to call
not merely for a correlation between demographic factors and restrictive legislation, but rather for a more deterministic finding of necessary and sufficient conditions. But, viewed from this perspective, the
argument for demographically driven policy outcomes is even weaker.
The vast majority of jurisdictions that share what might be considered
sufficient demographic factors—such as growth in immigrant populations or having a recently arrived immigrant population—do not propose or pass immigrant-related laws. Even taking the case of the
enacting city with the highest proportion of recent immigrants—
Herndon, Virginia, where recent immigrants accounted for about 18%
of the town’s residents in the 2005–2009 period—we find that 108
other municipalities with even higher proportional populations of
recent immigrants (including thirty-three with recent immigrants
accounting for over 25% of the town’s residents) took no action.158
Thus, even if we were to look for necessary and sufficient conditions
rather than statements of probability derived from statistical principles, it is abundantly clear that demographic change from recent
immigration is not a sufficient condition for restrictive action.
Even if immigration-induced change within a jurisdiction is insufficient, by itself, to provoke legislative response, might such change be
necessary? We find that twelve out of the seventy-nine municipalities
that have passed restrictive ordinances (or 15% of the cases) have
156

See infra Table A.
See infra Tables B–C.
158 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2005–2009 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 5-YEAR
ESTIMATES YEAR OF ENTRY BY CITIZENSHIP STATUS IN THE UNITED STATES, tbl.B05005.
157
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recent immigrant populations that are below the national average for
cities, and that fifty of the seventy-nine have below-average growth
rates in their foreign-born populations.159 Thus, we draw the conclusion that demographic change is not only an insufficient condition; it is
an unnecessary one as well.
C. The Saliency of Partisanship
Admittedly, tests of necessary and sufficient conditions in a
deterministic framework present a much higher bar for confirmation
than tests of statistical significance in a probabilistic framework.
Regardless of the approach, however, we have the same set of findings: The catalytic characteristic initiating the proposal and passage of
subfederal immigration policy in most restrictive jurisdictions is not
demographic upheaval. Rather, the single determinative factor seems
to be the existence of a partisan mix which is highly receptive to
restrictionist legislation. Importantly, 78% of the municipalities that
proposed restrictive ordinances, and 83% of municipalities with
restrictive ordinances, are in Republican-majority counties. At the
state level, nearly two-thirds of states with restrictive immigration
laws had a Republican majority of voters, and of those states that have
passed major pieces of restrictive legislation on enforcement and
employer verification, 94% had Republican majorities.160
In sum, our empirical analysis shows that the restrictive responses
of local governments to undocumented immigration are largely unrelated to the objectively measurable demographic pressures cited in
political, legislative, scholarly, and judicial justifications for the recent
proliferation of subfederal immigration regulation. Enacting jurisdictions cannot credibly claim the “vital necessity” required to meet a
Chy Lung test for validity. The statistical evidence we have gathered
and analyzed shows that the recency of migration, the growth of immigrant populations, and local economic and wage stress are irrelevant
to the proposal and passage of restrictionist laws. Instead, we have
found that political factors not commonly cited by proponents of state
and local immigration laws are more important to predicting when
159 Calculations based on jurisdictions present in both the 2005–2009 AMERICAN
COMMUNITY SURVEY 5-YEAR ESTIMATES, supra note 147, and CENSUS 2000 DECENNIAL
CENSUS SF3 FILE, supra note 143.
160 This compares to 57% of states with a Republican majority of voters in 2004.
Municipal-level findings are based on authors’ analysis of municipal ordinance data, see
Appendix A, and county-level data on 2004 Presidential vote choice as presented in
Robinson, supra note 149. State-level findings are based on authors’ cross-tabulation of
state legislative data, see Appendices B and C, and Election Results: America Votes 2004,
CNN.COM, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/president/ (last visited
Sept. 30, 2013) (providing state-level data on 2004 presidential vote choice).
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and where subfederal immigration policies will be enacted. In effect,
our research provides empirical footing for Professor Bulman-Pozen’s
observation that “[w]ith the Arizona law, the politics of immigration
are paramount.”161

IMPLICATIONS

OF THE

III
NEW IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM

The preceding discussion of Chy Lung’s prerequisites and our
unexpected discovery of the importance of partisanship are important
because they suggest that the new immigration federalism is galvanized by factors in a manner incommensurate with dominant scholarly
and judicial appraisals. When this resurgence of subfederal immigration policy proliferation is accurately assessed, its theoretical and constitutional underpinnings do not hold.
In Part III.A, we situate and contrast our evidence-based model
for subfederal policy proliferation within and against existing scholarly
models. First, we provide an account of how partisanship and political
dynamics matter in both federal and subfederal immigration lawmaking. Second, we argue that our politicized change model is consistent with descriptions of legislative cascades described by theorists in
other policy areas. As such, we draw a contrast with “functionalist”
theories of state and local action that assume the salience of demographic change for policy expression, and with “steam valve” theories
which suggest that state and local restrictionist policies relieve pressure on national restrictionist efforts.162
In Part III.B we turn to judicial analysis, highlighting how our
evidence-based model of state and local policy replication clashes with
traditional federalism assumptions. Instead of this traditional model,
we provide courts an empirically and normatively supportable basis—
one based in equality concerns—that should govern judicial evaluation of these laws.
A. Partisanship and Existing Theoretical Models of
Subfederal Action
1. Designed Policy Proliferation and the Political Safeguards of
Federalism
Our conclusions regarding partisanship undermine the dominant
narrative that has been used to justify these laws. In doing so, our data
161

Bulman-Pozen, supra note 111, at 485.
See Rodrı́guez, supra note 16, at 610–11 (advocating a functionalist approach to
immigration law that favors state action); Spiro, supra note 30, at 1635–37 (discussing the
“steam valve” argument for state and local immigration law); see also infra Parts III.A.3–4.
162
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raises three important questions about the recent policy proliferation
on immigration:
(a) Why is partisanship at the subfederal level relevant to legislation on immigration?
(b) Who is utilizing and mobilizing the partisanship dynamic to
achieve these legislative goals?
(c) How do political and policy dynamics at the local level relate
to those at the federal level?
This Part presents an abridged discussion of the political
dynamics that help answer these questions, directing readers to our
prior work for more in-depth explanations.163 This prior work,
grounded in qualitative political science methodology, lays the
descriptive foundation for the broader theoretical and legal conclusions we present here.
The answers to these questions reveal the methodology by which
partisan conditions have translated into subfederal restrictionist policies in several jurisdictions. We build a theory of politicized change on
immigration policy, where dedicated and focused policy activists seek
out politically receptive jurisdictions to enact increasingly restrictionist measures. Concurrently, these groups help stall bipartisan
immigration reform at the federal level to create the appearance of a
federal legislative void that they can then fill through state and local
laws.164 In revealing the true nature of subfederal immigration policy,
we provide a more accurate description of the process of policy
proliferation, while simultaneously sharpening our ability to identify
emerging opportunities for such proliferation.
Finally, in answering the third question listed supra, we show how
subfederal action and federal lawmaking are inextricably linked, with
the former exerting a gravitational pull on the latter, significantly
dampening the possibility of federal immigration legislation. Because
states and localities have focused significant attention on congressional silence, we emphasize the connection between subfederal policy
dynamics and federal legislative stagnation. This dynamic is largely
ignored in scholarly and judicial evaluations of the new immigration
federalism.

163

Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, supra note 23, at 1436–45.
As we note in The Importance of the Political in Immigration Federalism, restrictionist issue entrepreneurs are able to proliferate immigration laws in several jurisdictions
because they have effectively capitalized on two unique post–September 11 political
dynamics: increased party polarization and a rise in ethnic nationalism. Id. at 1446–48.
164
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a. Why is partisanship at the subfederal level relevant to
legislation on immigration?
Popular models of subfederal behavior predict the tendency of
state and local officials to advance non-mainstream positions on volatile policy issues. As Professor Roderick Hills notes, “given that
nonfederal politicians constitute the major source of competition to
congressional incumbents, it is natural that nonfederal politicians want
to make a name for themselves by taking the risk of advocating new
policies.”165 There is ample survey evidence to indicate that
Republican voters, and especially those who are active in party primaries, care intensely about immigration and hold restrictive views on
the matter.166 When this pattern in public opinion gets harnessed
through the primary process, Republican-heavy constituencies have
enabled primary challengers to mobilize against incumbents on the
immigration issue. Republican incumbents, in turn, have either been
defeated by more restrictionist challengers or have taken more conservative positions on immigration to avoid primary defeat.167
More recently, Professor Jessica Bulman-Pozen has articulated
how partisans have been able to utilize the federalist structure of our
government to instantiate subfederal policies oppositional to those
advanced by the party in power at the federal level.168 As she notes,
165 Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the
National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 23–24 (2007).
166 Lymari Morales, Americans’ Immigration Concerns Linger, GALLUP (Jan. 17, 2012),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/152072/Americans-Immigration-Concerns-Linger.aspx
(revealing that polls conducted before Republican primaries show 77% of Republican
voters were dissatisfied with the level of immigration in the country, and 71% wanted less
or the same level of immigration; the poll found that 64% of all Americans polled were
dissatisfied with immigration levels during the primary season); Frank Newport,
Republicans Prioritize Immigration; Dems, Financial Reform, GALLUP (Apr. 30, 2010),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/127607/republicans-prioritize-immigration-dems-financialreform.aspx (showing that plurality of self-identified Republican voters favored an immigration-reform bill over finance reform or energy bills, 45% to 37% and 15%).
167 See Laura Meckler, The GOP’s Immigration Dilemma, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2013, at
A12 (“For House Republicans, the issue is particularly treacherous. Attracting Hispanic
votes is an imperative for presidential candidates, but most House Republicans represent
overwhelmingly white districts safely in GOP hands; the most serious political threat they
will face is a primary challenge from someone more conservative.”). This dynamic was
evident in Arizona as far back as 2004 and 2006, as longstanding Republican incumbents
such as Congressman Jim Kolbe faced competitive primary elections by challengers
focusing on immigration and border-control issues. See Joseph Lelyveld, The Border
Dividing Arizona, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 15, 2006, at 40 (discussing the rise in Republican
primary candidates focused on immigration reform, including Kolbe’s 2004 reelection campaign, where immigration-focused challenger Randy Graf won 43% of the vote in the
Republican primary).
168 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming
2014) (manuscript at 7) (on file with the New York University Law Review) (“Today’s
ideologically cohesive, polarized parties help to explain state challenges to the federal

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\88-6\NYU603.txt

December 2013]

unknown

Seq: 38

IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM

25-NOV-13

12:34

2111

subfederal immigration policies, like Arizona S.B. 1070, are a prime
example of political parties usage of state fora to contest federal
approaches to enforcement, and articulate a competing view of what
they believe national policy should be.169
b. Who is utilizing and mobilizing the partisanship dynamic to
achieve these legislative goals?
We draw attention to this question because theoretical models of
policy proliferation provide that one of the preconditions necessary
for rapidly promoting a particular policy is the existence of a small
group of intensely interested actors.170 Once activated, this group can
build legislative momentum across several jurisdictions, instantiating
the desired policy goals in multiple locales. Moreover, it is important
to look beyond elected officials to determine the membership of the
group attempting to proliferate these subfederal policies.171
While restrictive local policies on immigration have had
numerous champions, a few figures emerge as central to the story of
immigration federalism as a widespread, national phenomenon.
Between 2001 and 2008, Congressman Tom Tancredo (R-CO), cable
host Lou Dobbs, the Federation for American Immigration Reform
(FAIR), and NumbersUSA played a critical role in preventing immigration legalization from garnering sufficient support among moderate Republicans in Congress.172 During this time, FAIR also began
to support state-level efforts on restrictive legislation, such as
Arizona’s Proposition 200 in 2004, which imposed proof-of-citizenship
and photo-identification requirements for voting.173
government. . . . Partisan federalism’s challenges follow from state-federal overlap and
integration, and they involve state and federal actors alike turning to state governments to
articulate and stage partisan competition.”).
169 Id. at Part I.B.3.
170 See Catherine L. Carpenter, Legislative Epidemics, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 8–10 (2010)
(describing how a “small core group of people” can cause a legislative epidemic).
171 See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 168, at 9 (“Today’s parties are best understood as
networks of individuals and organizations, including elected representatives and party officials, but also allied interest groups, issue activists, . . . and the like.”).
172 Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, supra note 23, at 1454–61 (describing the role that a
select few individuals and organizations have played in defeating moderate national legislation); see ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, IMMIGRANTS TARGETED: EXTREMIST RHETORIC
MOVES INTO THE MAINSTREAM (2008), available at http://archive.adl.org/civil_rights/anti_
immigrant/Immigrants%20Targeted%20UPDATE_2008.pdf (highlighting the antiimmigrant advocacy efforts of centralized groups, media figures, and politicians).
173 Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2252–60 (2013)
(holding that Arizona’s evidence-of-citizenship requirement was preempted by the
National Voter Registration Act of 1993).
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Since 2006, the work of proliferating legislation at the subfederal
level has found its strongest champion in Kris Kobach.174 In addition
to providing legal counsel for cities such as Hazleton, Pennsylvania,
and Farmers Branch, Texas, Kobach has also played a pivotal role in
crafting legislation in many of the same jurisdictions, including cities
like Hazleton and states such as Arizona and Alabama.175 Indeed,
IRLI designs and supplies model state and local legislation on its website for use by interested jurisdictions.176
Thus, while restrictive policies may have local sponsors in each
jurisdiction (a mayor, a state senator, or a governor, for example),
news reports and interviews reveal a small, nationally-involved group
of actors who are proliferating subnational legislation throughout the
country.177 We term this group of federated, nationally ambitious, and
involved actors “restrictionist issue entrepreneurs.”
c. How do partisan and policy dynamics at the local level
relate to those at the national level?
As detailed in Part I, legislative gridlock at the national level is a
vital doctrinal and political precondition for local action. The two
dynamics, however, are conventionally theorized as being only
sequentially related, with the pre-existence of the former necessitating
the latter. Our institutional and historical analysis, by contrast,
174 See Chin & Miller, supra note 71, at 258–62 (noting the importance of Kris Kobach
in promoting and defending state immigration laws); Kris W. Kobach, Why Arizona Drew
a Line, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2010, at A31.
175 Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, supra note 23, at 1456–57; Kent Jackson, Top
Court Gives City 2nd Chance, STANDARD SPEAKER, June 7, 2011, available at http://
standardspeaker.com/news/top-court-gives-city-2nd-chance-1.1158117 (noting that Kobach,
attorney for Hazleton, was encouraged by the Supreme Court’s Whiting decision and
quoting him as arguing that it “‘put Hazleton on very strong ground’” for remand consideration in front of the Third Circuit); George Talbot, Kris Kobach, the Kansas Lawyer
Behind Alabama’s Immigration Law, AL.COM (Oct. 16, 2011, 9:44 PM), http://blog.al.com/
live/2011/10/kris_kobach_the_kansas_lawyer_1.html; Hazleton Mayor Plans to Take
Immigration Fight to Supreme Court, FOX NEWS LATINO (Sept. 3, 2013), http://latino.fox
news.com/latino/politics/2013/09/03/hazleton-mayor-plans-to-take-immigration-fight-tosupreme-court (noting that Kobach authored Arizona’s immigration law).
176 See Model Laws, IMMIGR. REFORM L. INST., www.irli.org/laws (last visited Aug. 27,
2013).
177 See, e.g., How Attrition Through Enforcement Works, NUMBERSUSA, https://www.
numbersusa.com/content/learn/issues/american-workers/how-attrition-through-enforce
ment-works.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2013) (noting that immigration raids would be
unnecessary if federal, state, and local enforcement effectively made “living illegally . . .
more difficult and less satisfying over time”); see also David A. Fahrenthold, SelfDeportation Proponents Kris Kobach, Michael Hethmon Facing Time of Trial, WASH. POST
(Apr. 24, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-04-24/politics/35452165_1_
immigration-reform-law-institute-illegal-immigrants-michael-hethmon (reporting the sentiment that without Kris Kobach and Michael Hethmon, a fellow at IRLI, the restrictionist
movement would not have gotten off the ground).
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indicates that these two processes may work concurrently, or even
causally in the opposite direction than established convention.
Local action and federal inaction are connected by two important
partisan dynamics in immigration federalism—one political and the
other structural. First, restrictionist issue entrepreneurs have at times
fomented federal inaction so that they can continue the work of subnational policy proliferation. Second, the interconnectedness of our
federalist system suggests that the passage of state and local measures
exerts a gravitational pull on federal lawmaking, with their continued
existence stalling the ability to achieve federal legislative agreement.
On the first point, our qualitative empirical analysis shows that at
critical times restrictionist entrepreneurs have sought to stall comprehensive immigration reform at the federal level even when the federal
proposal ostensibly reflected the restrictionist agenda.178 This was perhaps most starkly evident in May 2012, when Kris Kobach expressed
his opposition to a congressional bill mandating the use of a federal
database (E-Verify) to check the immigration status of employees.
This stance appeared odd, as Kobach and other restrictionists supported the Legal Arizona Workers Act, which mandated use of that
same database for employers within the state, and was upheld by the
Supreme Court in Whiting. Kobach explained that an analogous federal mandate would “defang[ ] the only government bodies that are
serious about enforcing immigration law—the states.” Noting the
political interconnectedness between federal and state legislation and
judicial activity, Kobach continued: “The timing couldn’t be worse.
The bill stabs Arizona in the back, just after it won a victory in
[Whiting] . . . .”179
Thus, at times, restrictionist issue entrepreneurs have purposefully promoted legislative gridlock at the federal level, and then cited
the very national legislative inaction they helped foment to justify
restrictive solutions at the local level.180 Notably, engendering federal
178 Such activism makes sense when national compromises would moderate the enforcement-heavy approach advocated by most restrictionists. At times, however, issue entrepreneurs have rallied against national legislation comporting with their goals.
179 Kris W. Kobach, Another Amnesty?: New Bill Hobbles Border States, N.Y. POST
(June 15, 2011, 10:53 PM), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/
another_amnesty_LauPhaZnaURz3fUcpXAphK.
180 Our previous Article, The Importance of the Political in Immigration Federalism,
supra note 23, at 1457–61, details the legislative involvement of FAIR and NumbersUSA.
In 2004, while FAIR was striving to push back against legalization efforts in Washington,
D.C., following calls for comprehensive immigration reform by George W. Bush and John
McCain, it also gave financial backing to Arizona’s Proposition 200 campaign, a measure
modeled after Proposition 187 that sought to deny unauthorized immigrants access to
many public benefits. See Stephen Wall, Efforts Against Illegal Immigrants Rise, SAN
BERNARDINO SUN, Nov. 9, 2004 (noting that FAIR spent about $400,000 to get Prop. 200
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legislative gridlock is not a foregone conclusion, as immigrant legalization enjoyed the support of over sixty percent of Americans in 2006
and 2007,181 and comprehensive immigration reform included enforcement provisions favored by many restrictionists.182
Second, applying our findings on partisanship to federalism
theory reveals a dynamic feedback loop between subfederal and federal immigration lawmaking. This structural connectedness is baked
into our federalist structure and the political parties that dominate it.
Specifically, the decentralized structure of political parties across
various levels of government facilitates the tendency for subfederal
enactments to anchor the political positions taken by national party
members. Political parties provide the connective tissue between federal and subfederal actors, and they provide opportunities for factional contests within party electoral contests (like primaries).
As Dean Larry Kramer has long argued, national lawmakers of a
particular party are dependent to some extent on state and local officials from the same party.183 According to Kramer, the unique characteristics of political parties have created “a political climate in which
members of local, state, and national chapters are encouraged, indeed
expected, to work for the election of party candidates at every level—
passed). Indeed, pro-immigrant advocacy organizations in Washington viewed FAIR’s
foray into Arizona as connected to its Washington-based legislative strategy, as FAIR
sought to push back against moderate legislation being offered by Arizona’s Congressmen,
Representative Jim Kolbe, Senator Jeff Flake, and Senator John McCain. Interview by S.K.
Ramakrishnan with Frank Sharry, Executive Director of America’s Voice (Apr. 12, 2012)
(interview notes on file with the New York University Law Review); see also Jim Behnke,
The Tres Amigos—Kolbe, Flake, McCain, SIERRA VISTA HERALD (Jan. 8, 2004), http://
www.svherald.com/content/january/2009/09/19/23610 (critiquing the immigration bill introduced by Kolbe, Flake, and McCain).
181 See Joseph Carroll, Public Still Supports Path to Citizenship for Illegal Immigrants,
GALLUP (Mar. 14, 2007), http://www.gallup.com/poll/26875/public-still-supports-pathcitizenship-illegal-immigrants.aspx (revealing that a majority of Republicans, Democrats,
and independents favor allowing unauthorized immigrants to remain in the U.S. to work or
become full citizens).
182 See Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S. 1348, 110th Cong.
§§ 101–102, 112, 202 (2007) (including provisions for enhanced border and interior
enforcement).
183 Kramer, Understanding Federalism, supra note 28, at 1528; see also Bulman-Pozen,
supra note 111, at 502 (“On Kramer’s account, the role political parties play in building
relationships among politicians is what matters: Democratic Congresspersons may be
inclined to protect state prerogatives because of their relationships with state Democratic
parties, . . . but this should in the aggregate lead Congress to attend to state prerogatives.”).
To be clear, our focus here is Kramer’s suggestion that political partisanship builds unavoidable and strong links between federal and subfederal officials. See Bulman-Pozen,
supra note 168 (arguing that understanding parties as ideologically cohesive “bolsters
[Kramer’s] claim that partisanship generates thick ties between state and national politicians”). We express no opinion on, and do not defend, Kramer’s understanding of political
parties as nonideological or constructed for the primary purpose of winning elections.
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creating relationships and establishing obligations among officials that
cut across government planes.”184 As such, party decentralization and
interdependence of officials across jurisdictions helps ensure that the
“politics” of the political process will protect federalism values,
without court intervention.185 We use Kramer’s foundational observation to make a related, but different point.
The federated nature of parties forces federal lawmakers to take
heed of the immigration positions taken by subfederal officials affiliated with their political party.186 When state and local politicians promote restrictionist policies in their jurisdictions to gain notoriety or to
challenge incumbents by exploiting intraparty schisms,187 party members at the federal level must account for these positions lest they
harm their own chances for reelection.188 This is so because national
184

Kramer, Understanding Federalism, supra note 28, at 1528.
Id. at 1536 (“[T]he parties influenced federalism by establishing a framework for
politics in which officials at different levels were dependent on each other to get (and stay)
elected.”); see also Kramer, Political Safeguards of Federalism, supra note 28, at 279
(attributing the unique role of federalism in American politics, in part, to decentralized
parties and mutual dependency among them).
186 Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local Ordinances, 2007 U. CHI.
LEGAL F., 2007, at 27, 39–40 (“In 1994, his popularity sagging, California Republican
Governor Pete Wilson backed . . . Proposition 187. . . . Wilson was re-elected.”).
187 Cf. Hills, supra note 165, at 23–24 (“Finally, given that nonfederal politicians constitute the major source of competition to congressional incumbents, it is natural that
nonfederal politicians want to make a name for themselves by taking the risk of advocating
new policies.” (footnote omitted)).
188 See Kramer, Understanding Federalism, supra note 28, at 1536 (noting that politicians at various levels of government depend on each other to be re-elected); Meckler,
supra note 167 (explaining the vulnerability House members face within their districts and
noting that Senator Lindsey Graham faces strict opposition from NumbersUSA and other
restrictionist entrepreneurs for his support of the proposed comprehensive immigration
reform bill). This reputational dynamic was also evident during the Republican presidential
primaries of 2012, as the major national candidates backed Arizona’s efforts. See Michael
A. Memoli, Romney Calls Arizona Immigration Law a Model for the Nation, L.A. TIMES
(Feb. 22, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/print/2012/feb/22/news/la-pn-gop-debate-illegalimmigration-20120222. Local party actors are increasingly promoting enforcement-heavy
positions within their jurisdictions. Subsequently, these policy positions filter upwards and
affect the party’s policy vision at the national level, as members of Congress and those
vying for the presidency are compelled to expressly or tacitly support the actions of fellow
party members. As such, national party officials feel compelled to support enforcementonly provisions at the federal level, because local party members have already generated
momentum for restrictionist policies. See Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, supra note 23, at
1472. Consequently, federal immigration proposals—particularly those that are bipartisan
and tend to moderate the more extreme enforcement elements of state and local laws—
inexorably grind towards gridlock. As examples, comprehensive federal immigration proposals failed in 2002 and 2007, and the DREAM Act failed in 2011, despite significant
popular support. See AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, THE DREAM ACT: CREATING
OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMMIGRANT STUDENTS AND SUPPORTING THE U.S. ECONOMY 5–6
(2011), available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Dream_Act_
updated_051811.pdf.
185
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party members are in part beholden to the endorsements and support
of state and local party members. After a state or locality has enacted
a restrictionist law, national lawmakers from that jurisdiction must
often take care not to oppose such efforts lest they provide fodder for
a restrictionist challenger in the next intraparty primary election.
Accordingly, subfederal immigration policies effect stalemate at the
national level by ensuring that congresspersons, especially House representatives from racially homogeneous, heavily Republican districts,
resist comprehensive federal reform efforts that seek to do anything
more than increase federal enforcement mechanisms.189
The bottom line is this: Subfederal policy proliferation and federal legislative silence are not independent phenomena; they are inextricably linked by the structure of our federalist system and
correspondingly federated party structures. Accounting for the federated nature of political parties and the purposeful stalling efforts of
entrepreneurs adds an extra layer of caution to the difficulties with
federal action that are already described in the literature, including
filibuster pivots and targeted minority-group advocacy.190 To be sure,
these legislative forces are operative in policy areas beyond immigration. Yet, it is a point worth emphasizing with respect to immigration
specifically: The notion of a federated policy dynamic shaped by party
structures, in which the subfederal tail sometimes wags the federal
dog, rubs against the still dominant understanding of subnational
involvement in immigration enforcement as dictated by the national
government. In our model, restrictionist positions that find traction in
particular subfederal jurisdictions will necessarily tie the hands of
national lawmakers of the same party. Completing the feedback loop,
state and local officials argue that this federal stalemate creates the
appropriate constitutional conditions of federal inaction and ineptitude to justify more subfederal lawmaking.
None of the points we have made here are intended to act as a
negative appraisal of the work of issue entrepreneurs or the use of
189 See Tom Cotton, It’s the House Bill or Nothing on Immigration, WALL ST. J., July 11,
2013, at A15 (stating that the Senate’s immigration bill would be rejected by the House due
to its emphasis on legalization and lack of enforcement provisions); Philip Elliott, House
Judiciary Chairman Rejects ‘Special Pathway to Citizenship,’ SALT LAKE TRIB. (June 30,
2013, 5:43 PM), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/world/56535553-68/senate-immigration-billpathway.html.csp (noting that Rep. Bob Goodlatte, the Republican Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee denounced the Senate’s passage of a comprehensive immigration bill, stating that immigration legislation cannot provide a special pathway to citizenship for illegal residents).
190 See Hills, supra note 165, at 13 (noting that it is much easier to derail federal legislation than it is to enact it). For specifics on how Senate filibuster rules and restrictionist
group advocacy have stalled federal immigration legislation, see Ramakrishnan &
Gulasekaram, supra note 23, at 1446–47.
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partisan dynamics to instantiate policy. Further, we are not advocating
that courts should concern themselves with the reasons for federal legislative gridlock in their assessment of preemption cases in the immigration setting.191 Rather, our purpose is to accurately theorize the
genesis of the new immigration federalism, so that we can then investigate the assumptions of scholars and courts who evaluate the phenomenon and articulate how courts should be evaluating the
phenomenon.
2. Challenges to Established Theoretical Accounts of Subfederal
Immigration Action
Many scholars have evaluated the potential utility of state and
local immigration regulations, and the value of abandoning exclusive
federal control over all matters immigration.192 In defending constitutional leeway for such enactments, scholars have assumed that these
nonfederal policy expressions arise as responses to demographic shifts
and variations.193 Others, even if agnostic to the question of whether
subfederal laws are organic responses to pressing concerns, have
argued that such regional laws can dissipate extremist impulses at the
local level, thereby preventing large-scale instantiation of those
intensely held minority perspectives. Our reappraisal of the new
immigration federalism undermines these accounts.
The primary problem with current scholarly appraisals of the new
immigration federalism is their choice of conceptual frame to describe
the trend. Commonly used theoretical models assume the responsiveness of public policy to regional or unique demographic concerns.194
191 Indeed, we argue that preemption jurisprudence used in alienage law assessments is
not the proper lens through which to view these enactments in the first place. See supra
notes 95–102 and accompanying text.
192 See, e.g., Rodrı́guez, supra note 16, at 617 (discussing how the demographic shifts
caused by globalization and immigration impact parts of the country differently, and thus
the viability of different immigration strategies will vary); Schuck, supra note 30, at 68–83
(arguing that federal immigration policy might be better served if Congress authorized
state authority in some policy areas, like employment-based admissions, state and local
criminal justice systems integration, and employer sanctions); Spiro, supra note 30, at
1635–39 (noting that giving states space to enact their own subfederal anti-immigrant legislation relieves political pressure to promote those restrictive policies at the federal level).
193 See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 18, at 805–07 (explaining that subfederal lawmakers
feel frustrated by perceived disproportionate burdens suffered as a result of illegal immigration); Matthew Parlow, A Localist’s Case for Decentralizing Immigration Policy, 84
DENV. U. L. REV. 1061, 1071 (2007) (“Indeed, different states and local governments are
affected in drastically different manners—both positively and negatively—by illegal immigration. Local governments should be able to respond accordingly, especially if the federal
government is not meeting those communities’ needs.”).
194 See supra notes 15–19 and accompanying text (describing the immigration federalism
frameworks posited by several authors).
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In contrast, our evidence suggests that this recent policy proliferation
resembles a “cascade” phenomenon similar to that described by
Professors Sunstein and Kuran in other policy areas.195 The saliency of
partisanship—and not demography—in subfederal immigration regulation indicates that this recent spate of state and local immigration
regulation is a real-time illustration of Sunstein and Kuran’s model,
which highlights the influence of information deficits and reputational
concerns on public policy.196 As they note, in a policy debate, sometimes a minority position or one based on empirically dubious claims
can triumph in the legislative and political sphere by exploiting the
cognitive biases of the public and elected officials.197
In such cascades, interested persons take advantage of limited,
and often incorrect, information about an issue or apparent problem
to drive public policy.198 Taking advantage of information scarcity and
cognitive biases, they explain, “availability entrepreneurs” are able to
create public concern on a topic and proliferate policy solutions,
regardless of the necessity, efficacy, or proportionality of those solutions.199 Sunstein and Kuran explain how these costly cognitive errors
have manifested in cascades in water and environmental pollution
policy, pesticide contamination of food, and high-profile human tragedies (such as plane accidents).200 Situating this information-deficit
manipulation within the larger legislative context of policy proliferation, Professor Catherine Carpenter argues that rapid legislative
momentum develops across several jurisdictions when (a) few,
intensely interested actors, (b) armed with a sticky message, (c)
operate in a receptive context.201 She uses examples from drunkdriving, three-strikes, and sex-offender laws to show how legislative
cascades initiate and spread at particular moments in our social consciousness, given ripe political and historical factors.202
195

Sunstein & Kuran, supra note 29, at 715–28.
Id. at 685–701 (discussing how availability cascades can generate widespread mistaken beliefs because of informational availability and reputational concerns, and the susceptibility of the public and elected officials to cognitive biases in information processes).
197 Id. at 714; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to
Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 76 (2000) (describing how, in the absence of their own private
information, people tend to follow others, and this process helps reach extreme policy positions); Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 87, 90 (1999) (discussing how
“social entrepreneurs” are eager to exploit group pathologies).
198 Sunstein & Kuran, supra note 29, at 714.
199 Id. at 687 (emphasis omitted).
200 Id. at 691–703 (discussing policy responses to the health concerns regarding Love
Canal in New York, the anxieties caused by pollutants such as Alar, and the 1996 crash of
TWA Flight 800 as examples of availability errors and cascades in action).
201 See Carpenter, supra note 170, at 8–10.
202 Id. at 13–21.
196
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Our qualitative empirical work has already identified the
intensely interested actors in the immigration policy context—those
groups including FAIR, IRLI, NumbersUSA, and individuals such as
Tom Tancredo and Kris Kobach—whom we have referred to as
restrictionist issue entrepreneurs.203 Armed with prefabricated model
legislation204 and predesigned legal defenses, these issue entrepreneurs have found willing allies in elected officials such as Arizona
Governor Jan Brewer, Arizona state Senator Russell Pearce, and
former Hazleton Mayor Lou Bartletta. Foremost amongst the informational deficits exploited by restrictionist issue entrepreneurs are the
generally held beliefs required to meet Chy Lung’s “vital necessity”
standard—i.e., that immigrants are causing uniquely insurmountable
public policy problems that require enforcement-heavy responses, the
same propositions undermined by our empirical inquiry. These informational claims are particularly sticky in the immigration context, persisting despite the experience of jurisdictions passing immigration
legislation—e.g., Riverside, New Jersey; Oklahoma; and Alabama—
that have suffered greater economic distress after the legislation
passed and have, subsequent to the passage of restrictionist legislation, seen a substantial labor source and an important consumer base
driven away.205 Our theoretical orientation draws distinctions with,
and identifies the weaknesses of, current scholarly models.

203 See supra notes 172–77 and accompanying text for further discussion of restrictionist
entrepreneurs.
204 Model Laws, IMMIGR. REFORM L. INST., available at http://www.irli.org/laws (last visited Aug. 27, 2013).
205 See Patrik Jonsson, Why Republicans Are Doing an About-Face on Tough Alabama
Immigration Law, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/
USA/Politics/2011/1116/Why-Republicans-are-doing-an-about-face-on-tough-Alabamaimmigration-law (“Prof. Samuel Addy . . . recently predicted that HB 56 will reduce the
Alabama economy by $40 million as income and spending by both illegal and legal
Hispanic immigrants will decline. What’s more, employers face troves of fresh paperwork
and licensing requirements . . . that they say will potentially hurt business.”); Peter J. Spiro,
Be Careful What You Wish For, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2012, 1:49 PM), http://www.nytimes.
com/roomfordebate/2011/10/04/should-alabama-schools-help-catch-illegal-immigrants/becareful-what-you-wish-for-alabama (arguing that Alabama’s law, driving out immigrants,
will force the state to appreciate their value); NewsHour: Alabama’s Immigration Law
(PBS Oct. 13, 2011), transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/julydec11/alimmigration_10-13.html (discussing the adverse impact of HB 56 on the agriculture
and construction industries).
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3. The Fallacy of the Functionalist Model
Subfederal immigration policy largely reflects naked political
preference and opportunistic use of party polarization.206 This conclusion complicates assumptions made by a number of scholars.
Professor Cristina Rodrı́guez has argued that what is “missing” from
debates over the constitutionality of subfederal enactments is “a functional account that explains why state and local measures have
arisen . . . over the past five to ten years, and how this reality on the
ground should reshape our conceptual and doctrinal understandings
of immigration regulation.”207 Indeed, we agree with Professor
Rodrı́guez that purely legal constitutional debates over subfederal
involvement in immigration focusing on federalism and preemption
questions miss crucial on-the-ground factors that should influence
judicial and policy evaluations of these laws. However, we argue that
the missing reality is not the new demography and geography of immigration; rather, it is the new politics of immigration.
Our model proposes that restrictive subfederal immigration laws
proliferate in jurisdictions when political conditions are ripe, not
because the legislation presents a unique method of addressing an
emerging policy challenge. Accordingly, it is far from clear that “local
experimentation will be of tremendous value in this context.”208 The
“experimentation” currently occurring in the immigration field has
little demonstrative value to other jurisdictions;209 it changes the terms
and tenor of the national debate on immigration, but does not solve
the on-the-ground problems.
Undoubtedly, functionalist accounts of subfederal legislation
serve the important purpose of carving out a normative space for local
involvement, especially in the integrationist efforts with which much
of Professor Rodrı́guez’s work is concerned. It may very well be preferable to locate and institute such measures at the local level. And, we
agree with her underlying point that uniformity in immigration policy
across the nation may not be necessary or normatively desirable.210
206 See supra Part II.C; see also Sunstein, supra note 197, at 76 (showing how limited
private information tends to make people follow others, and reach more extreme policy
positions).
207 Rodrı́guez, supra note 16, at 571.
208 Id. at 609; see also Huntington, supra note 18, at 830–38; Parlow, supra note 193.
209 Many of these ordinances, however, do demonstrate the social and economic pitfalls
of local regulation. Several states have abandoned or reconsidered their enforcementheavy approaches after enactment, and after experiencing the consequences of such laws.
See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 22, at 1711–12 (discussing the repeal of antiimmigrant laws in Oklahoma and Riverside, New Jersey after the laws led to dramatic
decreases in their migrant worker population).
210 See Rodrı́guez, supra note 16, at 571, 611.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\88-6\NYU603.txt

December 2013]

unknown

Seq: 48

IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM

25-NOV-13

12:34

2121

However, our data shows that current local participation in immigration regulation is not occurring in places that are particularly affected
by immigration. Perpetuating the assumption that demographic
changes explain policy responses lends credence to the claims of legal
necessity proffered by states like Arizona and cities like Hazleton. In
contrast, we have shown that states and localities that pass immigration laws often experience little “need” for such regulation—at least
not in the functional or instrumental sense.211
4. A Cascade, Not a Steam Valve
Other theories of immigration federalism must also be reconsidered. For example, it is tempting to agree with Professor Peter Spiro’s
intuition that leeway for isolated, subfederal anti-immigrant regulation relieves pressure to promote those restrictive policies by way of
federal legislation.212 Thus, according to his “steam valve” theory,
even if subfederal restrictionist measures primarily reflect raw political preference (and not necessary responses to pressing policy
problems), those measures in isolated localities could serve a normatively desirable purpose by providing a relatively contained outlet for
anti-immigrant feelings.213 As per the theory, allowing nativist legislative sentiments to find legislative expression at the local level dissipates the pressure to seek federal instantiation of the same policies; in
effect, the local expression relieves the pent-up pressure (as a steam
valve on a pressure cooker would) caused by restrictionist policy
momentum. In one example, addressing Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and the
constitutional challenge to the law, Professor Spiro argues that “in the
long run, immigrant interests will be better helped if the Supreme
Court upholds S.B. 1070. . . . If the Supreme Court strikes down S.B.
1070, anti-immigrant constituencies will redouble their efforts to enact
tougher laws at the federal level.”214
Spiro supports his argument as to the desirability of restrictionist
views by drawing upon historical development through the 1990s. To
211 Id. at 576 (“State and local officials are reacting to our shifting demography in
extraordinarily varied ways, particularly when it comes to how best to deal with the reality
of unauthorized immigration.”); id. at 580 (“One way to address the demographic pressures that have given rise to this spectrum of activity would be to call for strong federal
intervention to obviate the need for state and local regulation.”).
212 See Spiro, supra note 30, at 1636 (“Affording the states discretion to act on their
preferences diminishes the pressure on the structure as a whole; otherwise, because you
don’t let off the steam, sooner or later the roof comes off.”).
213 The limitation has to be defined in terms of the quantity of subfederal jurisdictions;
substantively, it is difficult to suggest that Alabama’s recent immigration law—which has
had the effect of driving immigrant children out of school—is relatively harmless, even if it
occurs only within an individual state.
214 Peter J. Spiro, Let Arizona’s Law Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2012, at A19.
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support this position, he primarily relies on the defeat of California’s
anti-immigrant Proposition 187, which he argues presaged the federal
efforts that led to the enforcement-heavy 1996 federal immigration
reforms contained in IIRIRA and PRWORA.215 However, his position does not account for immigration federalism post-2001 or the
proliferation of laws since 2005. Our analysis of the past decade-plus
of lawmaking suggests that the causal paths described by Spiro must
be reversed: Suppression of subfederal lawmaking does not necessarily promote restrictionist measures at the federal level;216 rather, purposeful suppression of federal lawmaking provides the receptive
legislative backdrop for promotion of extreme measures at the subfederal level.
The critical difference between a cascade understanding of state
and local immigration lawmaking and a steam-valve theory is that in
the cascade model, the issue entrepreneurs’ goal is to continue
proliferation of immigration laws and policies in every jurisdiction
that is politically ripe for legislation. Each successive enactment
builds, rather than dissipates, horizontal momentum across multiple
subfederal jurisdictions; it is a strategy that appears targeted towards
building a de facto national immigration policy through several subfederal enactments that emphasize heavy enforcement and denial of
benefits to noncitizens. Specifically, in the immigration context, we
believe that interested policy activists coordinate activity between the
local and federal levels so that legislative activity at the federal level
does not stand as an obstacle to further subfederal proliferation.217 A
stark example of this dynamic is Kris Kobach’s antipathy towards the
2012 federal E-Verify bill on the grounds that it would stifle analogous
state provisions, such as Arizona’s E-Verify law.218
Accordingly, whereas Professor Spiro imagines the restrictionist
subnational expression as the pressure-relieving end of a policy movement,219 our explanation perceives such expressions as the beginning
of a legislative cascade.220 Hazleton, for example, served as a
215

See Spiro, supra note 30, at 1637 & nn.35, 37–38.
Id. at 1635 (“A state disempowered from acting in its own jurisdiction will get its way
at the national level.”); id. at 1630 (“One must look to the consequence of such suppression and the possibility that frustrated state preferences may actually prompt the effectuation of anti-alien measures at the federal level.”).
217 See supra Part III.A.1; see also Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, supra note 23, at
1445–50 (using qualitative empirical data to show the highly networked and coordinated
work of immigration issue entrepreneurs at the federal and subfederal levels).
218 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
219 See Peter J. Spiro, supra note 214.
220 Here, we defend this claim only with regard to the time period we investigate
(2000–2012). In future projects we will address Professor Spiro’s account of legislative
action prior to this current era of enhanced party polarization on immigration issues.
216
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purposeful test case that soon led to restrictionist laws in Mississippi,
Georgia, Arizona, Alabama, and the cities of Farmers Branch and
Valley Park.221 The goal is to proliferate such subfederal regulations
and purposefully forego federal control that might moderate the gains
made at the state and local level. Increasing the number of states and
localities with restrictionist measures focuses, rather than disperses,
the pressure upwards to the federal level. This eventually shifts the
terms of national discourse toward a more restrictionist status quo
that does not appear to reflect national majoritarian preferences.
Again, our description of the legislative cascade and its consequences in immigration policy is not, by itself, a negative judgment of
the phenomenon. Rather, our modest purpose is to frame the trend
with a theoretical model that better accounts for the quantitative and
qualitative data from our investigation.
B. Courts and the New Immigration Federalism
Our empirical analysis of the conditions giving rise to recent state
and local immigration enforcement laws suggests that when these laws
are properly categorized as immigration laws, they cannot survive Chy
Lung’s exacting standard. Demographic concerns and attendant
public policy problems appear to have little to do with the proposal
and passage of these laws, and as such, the vital necessity standard
required under Chy Lung cannot be met. But, as we noted supra,
courts have chosen to treat these enactments as alienage laws instead
of immigration laws. Even the Supreme Court has followed this categorization, despite its acknowledgment that these subfederal ordinances are attempts to control entry and exit of noncitizens. As a
consequence, courts have primarily used a preemption framework in
determining the validity of these measures.222
Under a preemption framework, as opposed to an immigration
law structure, our fundamental conclusion on partisanship’s catalytic
role in the new immigration federalism does not necessarily render
221 See H.B. 488, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2012); H.B. 56, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala.
2011) (codified in part at ALA. CODE § 31-13 (LexisNexis 2011)); H.B. 87, 151st Gen.
Assemb. (Ga. 2011); Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 (Sept. 21, 2006), available at https://
www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/immigrants/hazleton_secondordinance.pdf; Valley Park, Mo.,
Ordinance 1708 (July 17, 2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/immigrants/
valleypark_ordinance.pdf; S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010), enjoined in part
by Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012); Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 2903
(Jan. 22, 2007), available at https://www.farmersbranch.info/sites/default/files/Ordinance
%20No%202903.pdf, invalidated by Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch,
577 F. Supp. 2d 858 (N.D. Tex. 2008).
222 See, e.g., Rubenstein, supra note 101, at 140–43 (arguing that the Supreme Court
categorized Arizona’s S.B. 1070 as an alienage law).
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such laws unconstitutional, or even unwise. Our work, however, does
cast doubt on some of the general federalism assumptions undergirding evaluations of state and local authority in this arena. Moreover, emerging research suggests a role for other judicial methods
(within an alienage-law framework) which courts have thus far
avoided in their analyses of these laws.
As the continued viability of subfederal immigration laws (or certain provisions thereof) in several jurisdictions demonstrates, states
and localities have achieved some moderate success in instantiating
their laws despite their inability to meet Chy Lung’s rigorous standards for subfederal involvement. Assuming arguendo that recent
subfederal enactments are alienage law, we explain in this Subpart the
impact of our evidence-based understanding on current judicial analysis of these laws. First, we show that the current spate of subfederal
immigration lawmaking does not fit within a traditional paradigm of
state and local policy experimentation. Next, we explain why our
empirical investigation supports an equal protection framework for
evaluating state and local immigration laws. Finally, we offer some
concluding thoughts on the longterm constitutional significance of
recent judicial decisions in this field.
1. The Values of Federalism
Courts considering challenges223 to state and local immigration
regulations currently employ preemption and federalism frameworks
to guide their discussion of subfederal lawmaking.224 In cases where
specific and recent federal law exists, courts use express preemption
methodology to compare federal law to subfederal law, upholding
subfederal law where federal law explicitly allows concurrent
223 Currently, several suits concerning the laws of a number of jurisdictions are making
their way through the appeals process. Most notably, the Supreme Court decided Arizona
v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012), and has remanded the Hazleton, Pennsylvania case
in light of its decision in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011), which
upheld the Legal Arizona Worker’s Act. The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari
from the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling on Alabama’s law. United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d
1269 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2022 (2013). And, in light of Arizona v. United
States, both the Fourth and the Fifth Circuits have recently rendered opinions on state and
local immigration laws. See United States v. South Carolina, No. 12-1096, 2013 WL
3803464, at *1 (4th Cir. July 23, 2013) (enjoining several provisions of state law, but not
addressing the district court’s decision to dissolve injunction of other provisions); Villas at
Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, No. 10-10751, 2013 WL 3791664, at *1 (5th
Cir. July 22, 2013) (en banc) (enjoining city’s illegal-alien rental ordinance).
224 See generally Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 22 (demonstrating that immigration
law does not typify issues ripe for the federalism framework).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\88-6\NYU603.txt

December 2013]

unknown

Seq: 52

IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM

25-NOV-13

12:34

2125

regulation or maintains an exception for subfederal participation.225
As an example, in Whiting, the Court focused on the specific meaning
of the “licensing and similar laws” exception written into 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a(h)(2) to determine whether federal law expressly preempted
or permitted Arizona’s employer sanctions law.226
But, as the opinions in Arizona v. United States demonstrate, laws
like S.B. 1070 are difficult to assess within an express preemption
framework because of the lack of specific or responsive federal legislation on the topic. Thus, in exploring more nebulous grounds for preemption, states and localities, as well as courts, resort to broader
notions of federalism.227 In Arizona, for example, the argument that
states have inherent sovereign power to exclude unwanted immigrants
resonated with at least one Justice.228 Even amongst courts and justices disinclined toward state and local immigration lawmaking, discussions of the desirability of subfederal action are at times
intermingled with invocations of federal exclusivity in immigration
policy on the one hand and the benefits of decentralized decisionmaking on the other.229 Fundamentally, these assessments view
225 See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1981 (upholding Arizona’s licensing law on the grounds
that it “falls well within the confines of the authority Congress chose to leave to the States
and therefore is not expressly preempted”); Keller v. City of Fremont, 719 F.3d 931, 941
(8th Cir. 2013) (upholding city’s rental ordinance against preemption challenge).
226 Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1977 (“When a federal law contains an express preemption
clause, we ‘focus on the plain wording of the clause . . . .’ IRCA expressly preempts States
from imposing ‘civil or criminal sanctions’ on those who employ unauthorized aliens,
‘other than through licensing and similar laws.’” (citations omitted)).
227 See, e.g., Villas at Parkside Partners, 2013 WL 3791664, at *19 (“In many contexts, of
course, our federalist system permits states to ‘try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.’” (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))); id. at 30 (Higginson, J., specially concurring)
(“In particular, the Ordinance, inasmuch as it attempts to isolate Farmers Branch from a
problem common to other states by burdening other localities with non-citizens illegally in
the United States, may be invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause.”); CunninghamParmeter, supra note 22, at 1676 (noting that “[e]ver since Justice Brandeis characterized
states as laboratories of democracy, judges and scholars have championed the ability of
states to offer a diverse array of solutions to complex national problems” and stating that
“[t]oday, proponents of enhanced immigration restrictions apply the same rationale to
state immigration laws. They describe states as policy innovators that represent the future
of immigration enforcement”); Huntington, supra note 18, at 830–37 (analyzing the “relevance and robustness of traditional federalism debates to the novel questions raised by
immigration federalism”).
228 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2514 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“In light of the predominance of federal immigration restrictions in
modern times, it is easy to lose sight of the States’ traditional role in regulating immigration—and to overlook their sovereign prerogative to do so.”).
229 See id. at 2498–500 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (“The Government of the United States
has broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens. . . .
The pervasiveness of federal regulation does not diminish the importance of immigration
policy to the States. Arizona bears many of the consequences of unlawful migration.”);
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federal and subfederal policymaking as occurring in distinct spheres,
with an idealized understanding of state and local action.
As made apparent in the relevant literature,230 when courts provide constitutional leeway for state and local policymaking, they
unlock the theoretical benefits of federalism, to wit: (1) providing
more responsive government by matching local problems with local
solutions;231 (2) allowing for policy innovation through variegated
experimentation;232 (3) promoting intergovernmental competition,233
resulting in desirable outcomes for the citizenry; (4) helping states fulfill their roles as a bulwark against federal tyranny;234 and (5)
increasing democratic participation.235 The mechanism of politicized
legislative growth undermines several of these justifications236 proffered by courts and commentators invoking federalism-based policy
experimentation rationales for preserving state and local immigration
regulations.237
First, demographic changes and related economic stresses are, for
the most part, not unique to the localities proposing and enacting local
Hessick, supra note 8 (“Preemption cases often turn on close parsing of the relevant federal statute. . . . In addition, however, [Arizona] presents a broader theoretical question
about state regulation in other federally preempted fields (such as immigration).”).
230 See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism,
118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1261–62 (2009) (discussing autonomy and cooperative federalism
models as competing theoretical frameworks for federalism); Margaret H. Lemos, State
Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 744 (2011) (“Properly understood,
federalism is a means to an end. A federal system is desirable not for its own sake, but
because decentralized decision making is thought to have various desirable consequences.”); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L.
REV. 243, 266 (2005) (“[C]ommentators generally offer a variety of presumed benefits,
clustering around five areas: responsive governance, governmental competition, innovation, participatory democracy, and resisting tyranny.”); supra note 227 (discussing the
broadening notions of federalism embraced by states, localities, and courts).
231 See, e.g., Lemos, supra note 230, at 750 (noting that “state actors are better positioned than national legislators” to respond to local needs).
232 See, e.g., id. at 751–52 (discussing the benefits and limitations of states’ ability to
experiment with varying approaches to immigration laws).
233 See, e.g., id. at 745 (“[I]nterstate competition over regulatory authority produces
better policies, particularly when citizens can ‘vote with their feet’ by moving from state to
state.”).
234 See, e.g., id. at 748 (arguing the purpose of preventing tyranny through federalism is
not satisfied in the state enforcement context).
235 See, e.g., id. at 745 (pointing to federalism as means for increased citizen
involvement).
236 We note that a politicized model of subfederal immigration regulation may actually
serve to increase democratic participation by the polity, by galvanizing local citizenry in
support of such legislation.
237 Again, we note that we are not calling for the invalidation of all subfederal immigration lawmaking. There may be other justifications and defenses for these laws. Here we
only note that—to the extent those laws are defended on federalism-value-promoting
grounds—our empirical investigation undermines some of those justifications.
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immigration regulations. Indeed, the vast majority of jurisdictions
facing the same demographic changes, language isolation, and economic stresses do not even consider (let alone pass) immigration regulation. For example, New Mexico has experienced a rate of increase in
its unauthorized immigrant population that is similar to that in
Arizona,238 but the state has not passed any significant restrictionist
measures. The partisan conditions have not been favorable in New
Mexico, which has an electorate with 47% registered Democrat voters
and just 31% Republican.239 Furthermore, demographic change is
often unrelated to subfederal policy responses, as many enacting jursidictions are states and localities with comparatively and objectively
low levels of immigration and immigrants (and the attendant social
and economic challenges that would follow). This has certainly been
the case in restrictive states such as Alabama, Indiana, and Oklahoma,
where the proportion of unauthorized immigrants (2.5%, 1.8%, and
2.0% in 2010, respectively)240 has been significantly below the
national average (3.7%).241 If, in fact, objective and regionally specific
policy concerns could explain this current trend in subfederal lawmaking, we would expect demographic factors to emerge as highly
salient predictors of such laws. Instead, we found that partisanship
and political dynamics explain the trend.242
Second, this process of politicized change does not produce the
type of policy experimentation and innovation envisioned in Justice
Brandeis’s famous laboratories metaphor—that any given state may
independently serve as a “laboratory” for “social and economic experiments.”243 According to Professor Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, in
order for subfederal policies to be effective as policy experiments and
innovations, states must (1) internalize costs and (2) provide replicable approaches.244 He argues that when measured against these
238 PEW RESEARCH CTR., UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION: NATIONAL AND
STATE TRENDS, 2010, at 23 tbl.A3 (2011), available at http://www.pewhispanic.org/2011/02/
01/unauthorized-immigrant-population-brnational-and-state-trends-2010/.
239 See N.M. SEC’Y OF STATE, VOTER REGISTRATION STATISTICS REPORT (June 28,
2013), available at http://www.sos.state.nm.us/uploads/FileLinks/2966cef424224c59b1abaf
5b30a91116/STATEWIDE6282012.pdf (providing voter registration statistics by district).
240 See PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 238, at tbl.A4.
241 See id. at 1.
242 See supra Part II.B; see also Bulman-Pozen, supra note 168, at 15 (“The centrality of
partisanship instead points to [state contestation of federal policy] grounded in overlap and
integration. Party politics means that state opposition need not be based on something
essentially ‘state’ rather than ‘national.’”).
243 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (“[A] single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
244 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 22, at 1693.
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standards, the context of immigration federalism limits the ability of
states to innovate in meaningful ways and to serve as “laboratories” of
reform.245
Addressing the first requirement, Professor CunninghamParmeter writes that subfederal immigration regulations fail to internalize costs.246 Even assuming that unauthorized immigrants exacerbate the economic and social problems in states like Arizona and
Alabama, the ability of such ordinances to meet those challenges by
incentivizing immigrant movement out of the jurisdiction means that
these laws will almost certainly recreate and export those burdens to
neighboring jurisdictions.247 Moreover, individual states cannot deport
or expel persons from the country; only the federal government can.
Thus, enacting jurisdictions may be reducing the incentive to remain
within their borders, but they are unlikely to achieve attrition of the
unauthorized population from the United States.
In addition, our politicized model undermines the viability of the
replicability precondition for successful experimentation.248 Undoubtedly, the restrictive policies of high-enforcement states mimic each
other,249 but this mimicry is not the type celebrated in federalism
theory. Because the state and local laws generally do not respond to
critical on-the-ground challenges, other states and localities cannot
glean much about the utility of such laws in addressing any policy
challenges posed by unlawful migration.250 When issue entrepreneurs
245

Id. at 1676–77.
See id. at 1714 (“[S]tate immigration regulations export costs in a number of ways.”);
Hills, supra note 165, at 8 (listing immigration as an area “in which the risk of external
costs are [sic] so high that preemption of state law ought to be presumed (and is, as a
matter of judicial practice)”). But see Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 22, at 1711–14
(discussing substantial costs states do incur from subfederal immigration reform).
247 See Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, No. 10-10751, 2013 WL
3791664, at *30 (5th Cir. July 22, 2013) (Higginson, J., concurring) (suggesting that an ordinance that discouraged immigrants from living in Farmers Branch burdens other nearby
municipalities); Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 22, at 1714–23; see also Josh Gerstein,
South Carolina Law Sparks Suit from Justice Department, POLITICO (Oct. 31, 2011, 4:36
PM) http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1011/67274.html (“Pushing undocumented individuals out of one state and into another is simply not a solution to our immigration challenges.” (quoting Assistant U.S. Attorney General Tony West)).
248 See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 22, at 1697–99 (discussing the necessity that
other government bodies be able to duplicate the results of state experiments).
249 Id. at 1724; cf. Barak Y. Orbach et al., Arming States’ Rights, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1161,
1180–83 (2010) (discussing the proliferation of cloned Firearms Freedom Acts in states
across the country). To be clear, we have argued that the policies actually accrete punitive
provisions from enactment to enactment. We argue that they are largely the same, with
each subsequent jurisdiction and variation generally increasing enforcement possibilities.
250 See generally Sunstein & Kuran, supra note 29 (arguing that public discourse is distorted by responses to local preferences even in the face of reports and data which make
the endorsed local claims suspect).
246
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shop premade immigration solutions to jurisdictions based on partisanship and ripe political factors, the resultant policies are bound to
be similar.251 While this is “replication” in a strict sense, it is manifestly not replication as part of a meaningful process of effective
reform.
Third, politicized policy proliferation, with the political and structural entropies described in Part II, undermines competition between
governmental bodies.252 Productive competition is less likely when a
key competitor—here, the federal government—is hamstrung by
groups and individuals outwardly decrying federal failure while
fomenting the very failure they lament.253 The only comparisons for
the prefabricated policies instantiated in receptive jurisdictions are
identical or similar policies, framed by the same issue entrepreneurs,
enacted in other receptive jurisdictions.
Finally, in our evidence-based description of immigration legislation, state and local lawmaking ceases to be a vital bulwark against
federal tyranny. Instead, issue entrepreneurs use states and localities
in the immigration legislative landscape as “battering rams” to effectuate a minority position.254 In this strategy, according to Professors
Barak Orbach, Kathleen Callahan, and Lisa Lindemenn, “private
lawmakers”—a version of our issue entrepreneurs—provide states
and localities with legislation and attempt to enact laws in as many
jurisdictions as possible, seeking eventually to influence public

251 See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 168 (“Often working together directly or through
allied interests groups. . ., state and federal politicians shuffle ideas and even bill text back
and forth, seeking friendly partisan ground in which to plant their policies. The resulting
policies are only ‘state’ or ‘national’ in the sense of their site of enactment, not their purposes or intended audiences.”); Orbach et al., supra note 249, at 1182–83 (noting that
although Firearms Freedom Acts vary in particulars, all have “remained faithful to the
constitutional theories expressed in the original”).
252 Hills, supra note 165, at 4 (“Federalism’s value, if there is any, lies in the often competitive interaction between the levels of government.”). But see Bulman-Pozen, supra
note 111, at 487 (“But when Congress grants administrative authority to both the states
and the federal executive, an open-ended grant of authority may instead stimulate competition by empowering states to challenge the federal executive.”).
253 Professor Heather Gerken argues that S.B. 1070 led to federal engagement on immigration issues. Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism
All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 6, 68 (2010) (arguing that Arizona’s S.B. 1070
finally galvanized national debate and forced national elites to engage the issue). It is
worth noting that the engagement Gerken cites in support of her argument is federal judicial engagement. Specifically, she explains how S.B. 1070 led the United States Department
of Justice to sue Arizona. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
254 See Orbach et al., supra note 249, at 1163 (describing strategy of interest group focus
on state and local lawmaking as a “battering ram” to break down the “walls” of federal
policy, using the example of subfederal firearms bills).
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opinion and federal policy.255 The success of the strategy depends on
marrying a substantive policy position—here, restrictive immigration
policy—with states’ rights discourse.256 In doing so, subfederal entities
are able to tie their purported demographic challenges and restrictionist goals with the “classic trope[ ]” of challenging the national government’s violation of the nation’s deepest commitments.257 In effect,
national immigration priorities are co-opted by the tyranny of the
minority rather than by that of the majority.
Importantly, we are not arguing that legislative expression of
political preference is an illegitimate or unconstitutional use of state
and local authority. Rather, we are clarifying that this use of state and
local authority has been dominating subfederal immigration policy
since 2001, and that it should not be understood as representing replicable policy experimentation that reveals critical information about
the costs and benefits of varying legislative fixes. Rather, it should be
understood as a prepackaged solution in search of politically responsive jurisdictions.
2. Equality Concerns with the New Federalism
One of the consequences of miscategorizing recent subfederal
immigration enforcement efforts as alienage law (instead of immigration law) is that courts tend to assess these enactments through the
structural power frameworks discussed above. But, as we have argued,
the dubiousness of the empirical foundation of these state and local
laws undermines the assumptions made in traditional federalism analysis. Combined with emerging data regarding the ethnic antipathy
fueling the popularity of these laws within enacting jurisdictions, our
evidence-based inquiry calls for a wholly different framework—one
based in individual rights and equality guarantees—for understanding
the new immigration federalism.258
255 Id. at 1163–64; see also Bulman-Pozen, supra note 111, at 483–89 (arguing that states,
like Arizona with its immigration policy, are “goading” the federal government toward a
particular policy goal, and “when state and federal policies clash, states cast themselves as
faithful agents of Congress, seeking to carry out a statute as Congress intended, in contrast
to a wayward federal executive branch”).
256 See Cindy D. Kam & Robert A. Mikos, Do Citizens Care About Federalism? An
Experimental Test, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 589, 620 (2007) (presenting evidence that
political elites’ use of the tropes of trust in state government and federalism beliefs negatively influences support for federal policies).
257 See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 230, at 1279–80 (using Patriot Act objections as an example of subfederal entities “challenging a national policy for violating the
country’s deeper commitments”).
258 Cf. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, No. 10-10751, 2013 WL
3791664, at *30 (5th Cir. July 22, 2013) (Higginson, J., concurring) (“I would point out that
several other constitutional claims, under due process, equal protection, and the Privileges
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Even within alienage law, preemption and federalism concerns
are not the only frameworks for evaluating state and local enactments.
As Dean Harold Koh has observed, there is something intuitively disquieting about consistently applying a structural power context to
understand lawmaking that is, at its core, about the disparate treatment of individuals based on accidents of birth and veiled racial categories.259 In this Subpart, we argue that to the extent federal courts
insist on treating laws like S.B. 1070 as alienage laws, they must pay
heed to the equality concerns inherent in the creation—and not just
the execution—of such laws.
Historically, federal immigration law used explicit racial and
national origin disqualifiers for both admission and naturalization.260
Even now, immigrant visas are determined on a per-country basis.261
This disproportionately delays applicants from Mexico, China, India,
and the Philippines, which are countries accounting for a significant
percentage of unlawfully present persons.262 These federal immigration laws have never been subject to searching judicial inquiry.263
In reviewing subfederal alienage law, however, the Court, in the
wake of the Civil Rights movement, appeared to show some solicitude
for applying equal protection analysis.264 The most prominent equal
and Immunities and Commerce Clauses, were raised by the plaintiffs below but not
reached by the district court.”).
259 Harold H. Koh, Equality with a Human Face, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 51, 55–56 (1985).
260 See Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (excluding admission of
Chinese laborers to the United States) (repealed 1943); Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190,
43 Stat. 153 (establishing a quota system that limited immigration from Southern and
Eastern Europe) (repealed 1952); Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 889, 890
(restricting immigration from Asia, and also known as the “Asiatic Barred Zone Act”)
(repealed 1952); Naturalization Act of 1870, ch. 254, 16 Stat. 254 (repealed 1943).
261 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1152–1153 (providing yearly limitation of visas determined on a percountry basis, and providing formula for calculating visa allocation by country).
262 See generally Kevin R. Johnson, The Intersection of Race and Class in U.S.
Immigration Law and Enforcement, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2009) (describing how
U.S. immigration law excludes poor noncitizens of color); see also BUREAU OF CONSULAR
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, VISA BULLETIN VOL. IX, NO. 58, IMMIGRANT NUMBERS
FOR JULY 2013 (2013), available at http://www.travel.state.gov/visa/bulletin/bulletin_5993.
html (illustrating the oversubscription of visa applicants from China, India, Mexico, and
the Philippines).
263 See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (upholding federal law conditioning
federal public assistance on citizenship status, despite the Court having earlier struck down
state laws that did the same in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)); Fong Yue Ting
v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (upholding federal deportation law requiring Chinese
residents to produce a credible White witness to attest to their lawful presence).
264 See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 436–44 (1982) (recounting in detail the
Court’s decisions that applied equal protection to alienage and applying equal protection
to the California statute at issue); Graham, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (striking down state law
relying, in part, on equal protection grounds); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374
(1886) (striking down city laundry ordinance on equal protection grounds).
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protection case featuring unauthorized persons—more specifically,
unauthorized children—is Plyler v. Doe.265 Plyler’s methodology,
however, has always remained elusive:266 While the Court struck
down a Texas law discriminating against unauthorized children, it
declined to label unauthorized children a suspect class, or education a
fundamental right.267 Since Plyler, however, the Court has shied away
from its equal protection jurisprudence, appearing to conclude that
earlier alienage decisions are better read as preemption cases.268
Courts deciding recent subfederal immigration regulation cases
have continued this trend, employing structural power frameworks to
the virtual exclusion of equal protection and other individual rights
frameworks.269 Indeed, at the beginning of oral argument in Arizona,
before the U.S. Solicitor General began his presentation, Chief Justice
Roberts conspicuously interjected: “Before you get into what the case
is about, I’d like to clear up at the outset what it’s not about. No part
of your argument has to do with racial or ethnic profiling, does it? I
saw none of that in your brief.”270 The Chief Justice’s preemptive
strike prevented the Solicitor General from establishing the position
long held by many immigration scholars that immigration federalism
and racial and ethnic discrimination are tightly linked.271 As an
example of the connection, the U.S. Department of Justice recently
filed suit against one of S.B. 1070’s most vociferous proponents,
Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio, accusing him of unconstitutionally discriminating on the basis of race, color, and national origin.272
265

457 U.S. 202 (1982).
Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the
Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1731–34 (2010) (noting the limited impact of Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202 (1982), on later decisions).
267 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223.
268 Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 11 n.16 (1982) (citing David F. Levi, Note, The Equal
Treatment of Aliens: Preemption or Equal Protection?, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1069 (1979))
(arguing that the Court’s alienage decisions are better understood as preemption cases).
269 Koh, supra note 259; see also Garrett Epps, The Blessed Tedium of the Arizona
Immigration Case, ATLANTIC (July 29, 2010, 9:58 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/
national/archive/2010/07/the-blessed-tedium-of-the-arizona-immigration-case/60585/ (criticizing the district court’s lack of attention to equality and dignity concerns, and strict focus
on preemption and federalism analysis).
270 Transcript of Oral Argument at 33–34, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492
(2012) (No. 11-182), 2012 WL 1425227, at *33.
271 See, e.g., Karla Mari McKanders, Immigration Enforcement and the Fugitive Slave
Acts: Exploring Their Similarities, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 921, 947–49 (2012) (detailing similarities between laws regulating slaves and laws regulating migrants); Michael J. Wishnie,
Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and
Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (2001) (discussing state discrimination against immigrants in welfare benefits).
272 Complaint, United States v. Maricopa County, No. 2:12-cv-00981-ROS (D. Ariz.
May 10, 2012), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/arizona/
266
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Despite judicial avoidance of equal protection in its evaluation of
state enforcement schemes, the salience of ethnic nationalism in the
genesis of the new immigration federalism begs a greater role for
equality-based jurisprudential norms.273 First, political actors have
been, and are, aware of the underlying connection between immigration law, state and local law, and race. While enacting S.B. 1070,
Arizona’s legislature and Governor amended original language in the
bill in an attempt to address concerns raised by advocacy groups about
the potentially racially disparate effects of state and local immigration
enforcement.274 Thus, while denying that immigration regulation and
enforcement are inextricably tied to characteristics like race, national
origin, and color, subfederal jurisdictions have nevertheless conspicuously attempted to quash concerns that the laws arose out of illegitimate prejudices or inevitably will be enforced in illegitimate ways.
Second, elected officials and restrictionist issue entrepreneurs
have successfully packaged the new immigration federalism within the
post–September 11 historical narrative, imbuing immigration discourse with the language necessary to covertly indulge the racial and
cultural prejudices of particular voters. With post–September 11
national security considerations adding a level of legitimacy and plausible deniability to the role of racial antipathy in nativist sentiment,275
issue entrepreneurs conjured this dimension frequently in their advocacy of state and local laws.276 For example, undocumented
azdce/2:2012cv00981/700133/1/0.pdf?1336693795; Jerry Seper, Justice Dept. Accuses Ariz.
Sheriff Arpaio of Racial Profiling, WASH. TIMES (May 10, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/may/10/justice-department-plans-sue-ariz-sheriff-arpaio/; see also
Melendres v. Arpaio, No. PHX-CV-07-02513-GMS, 2013 WL 2297173 (D. Ariz. May 24,
2013) (finding that class action plaintiffs were entitled to injunctive relief from Maricopa
County Sheriff’s Office for Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations and permanently enjoining the County from other enforcement actions).
273 See, e.g., Michael A. Olivas, Lawmakers Gone Wild?, 61 S.M.U. L. REV. 99, 131
(2008) (describing English-only laws and local ordinances requiring immigration status
check for residential rentals as “sure signs of an ethnic and national origin ‘tax’ that will be
levied only on certain groups”); Michael A. Olivas, The Political Efficacy of Plyler v. Doe,
45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 15 (2011) (“Blowback in affected communities and increased
prejudice are sure to follow from sub-federal assumption of immigration powers.”).
274 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450 (changing S.B. 1070 text from “lawful contact” to “lawful
stop, attention, or arrest” and removing “solely” from “may not solely consider race, color,
or national origin”), available at http://www.azleg.gov/alispdfs/council/SB1070-HB2162.
PDF.
275 See, e.g., Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1261 (2004)
(tracing a genealogy of racial violence post–September 11); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the
Terrorist, 49 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1575, 1575 (2002) (discussing the racialized conception of
those identified as “Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim” after September 11, regardless of
citizenship status).
276 See, e.g., United States v. South Carolina, 840 F. Supp. 2d 898, 905 (D.S.C. 2011)
(“The South Carolina General Assembly took up the matter of state immigration
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immigrants frequently were lumped together with terrorists in discussions ranging from the U.S.–Mexico border crossing277 to the attempt
by states to grant driver’s licenses to unauthorized immigrants.278
Indeed, as Professor Jennifer Chacón notes, the term “border
security” emerged only after September 11. Prior discussions of
“border control” took on military metaphors and subsumed concerns
about homeland security and terrorism.279 Further, as Professor Leti
Volpp explains, terrorism and terrorists have been discretely racialized in contemporary social and legal discourse.280 Thus, the conflation of terrorism and unlawful immigration creates a distinct racial
context for subnational immigration laws.
Third, emerging social science research undermines the notion
that subfederal immigration laws are free from the taint of racial and
ethnic prejudice in their creation. The key findings in this data are: (1)
The use or perceived use of a foreign language pushes voters, especially Republican voters, to adopt more restrictive stances on immigration proposals;281 (2) media references to Latino immigrants
produce greater anxiety and provoke greater support for restrictive
action than similar references to European immigrants;282 (3) voters
are more likely to hold negative views of illegal Mexican immigrants
legislation . . . because of a perceived failure of the United States to ‘secure our southern
border,’ which ‘really jeopardize[s] our national security.’” (citations omitted)), modified,
906 F. Supp. 2d 463 (D.S.C. 2012), aff’d, 720 F.3d 518 (4th Cir. 2013).
277 See J.D. HAYWORTH & JOSEPH J. EULE, WHATEVER IT TAKES: ILLEGAL
IMMIGRATION, BORDER SECURITY, AND THE WAR ON TERROR 5–8 (2006) (discussing the
possibility of terrorists sneaking in through the U.S.–Mexico border).
278 CNN’s Lou Dobbs Tonight frequently made the linkages between granting state
driver’s licenses to illegal immigrants and terrorist threats to homeland security. See, e.g.,
Lou Dobbs Tonight (CNN television broadcast Oct. 17, 2007), transcript available at http://
transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0710/17/ldt.01.html (“The governor . . . will make it
easier for law breakers of all sorts—including terrorists—to take advantage of New York
State’s driver’s licenses . . . .”).
279 Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control
and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1853 (2007) (“[R]emovals of noncitizens . . . can be, and frequently are, depicted as national security policy. With regard to
border enforcement efforts, the phrase ‘border security’ has become a ubiquitous descriptive term . . . .”).
280 See, e.g., Volpp, supra note 275, at 1576 (“The stereotype of the ‘Arab terrorist’ is
not an unfamiliar one. But the ferocity with which multiple communities have been interpellated as responsible for the events of September [11] suggests there are particular
dimensions that have converged in this racialization.”).
281 Dan Hopkins, How Accents Influence the Immigration Debate, WASH. POST (Feb. 10,
2013, 12:16 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/02/10/howaccents-influence-the-immigration-debate/ (providing a summary by a political science professor of published work from various scholars on how aversion to foreign languages drives
opposition to immigration, particularly among Republicans).
282 Ted Brader et al., What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group
Cues, and Immigration Threat, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 959 (2008).
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than illegal immigrants from Asia or Europe;283 and (4) voters are
more likely to monitor the legal status of Latino immigrants than
European immigrants for the purposes of granting public benefits.284
Thus, we argue that ethnic antipathy is an essential ingredient of
these laws at their inception. These conclusions bolster the argument
for a strong judicial role in monitoring and deterring the use of
unlawful and illegitimate characteristics in the genesis of subfederal
immigration law.285 These findings do not rely on disparate or coincidental effects;286 they show that racial concerns animate laws premised on ostensibly neutral immigration status.287 While these
findings may not yet reflect the level of intentionality required to initiate a claim of racial discrimination,288 they support the idea that
structural power frameworks fail to capture the nuanced racial
dynamics actually at play in the creation of subfederal immigration
law. As Professor Hiroshi Motomura argues, some courts may already
be aware of this latent racial dynamic, implicitly folding equality considerations into their preemption analysis when striking down state
and local laws.289 Indeed, recently, a federal district court assessed,
under equal protection standards, the constitutionality of Arizona’s
denial of driver’s licenses to undocumented persons granted deferred
action (under the Administration’s Deferred Action for Child
Arrivals program), concluding that the challengers had shown a likelihood of success on the merits to support their motion for preliminary
283 Karthick Ramakrishnan et al., Illegality, National Origin Cues, and Public Opinion
on Immigration (2010) (working paper), available at http://polisci.osu.edu/sites/polisci.osu.
edu/files/_illegality,%20national%20origin%20cues,%20and%20public%20opinion%20on
%20immigration_.pdf (noting that Americans view Mexican immigrants less favorably
than immigrants from other parts of the world).
284 See id. at 1 (“[R]acial affect, particularly with respect to negative attitudes towards
Latinos, also play a significant role in shaping public anxiety over immigration and immigration policy.”).
285 See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
286 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (explaining that evidence of disparate
impact alone is insufficient to satisfy the constitutional standard required for a finding of a
racial classification).
287 See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (invalidating Alabama’s felony disenfranchisement law based on evidence that the provision was created to disproportionately
affect poor Black citizens).
288 See Davis, 426 U.S. at 240–41 (describing cases holding that racial discrimination
claims require showing a discriminatory purpose).
289 Motomura, supra note 266, at 1743 (noting that “[a]n equal protection challenge
would require proof of discriminatory intent, but a preemption challenge can persuade
some judges based on reasonable possibility of discriminatory intent,” and commenting
that the court in Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 525–29 (M.D. Pa. 2007)
might not have found the ordinance preempted had the plaintiffs not brought forth evidence of racial and ethnic bias).
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injunction.290 Our evidence and explanation of ethnic nationalism
lends further weight to this intuition.
We note also that these findings are consistent with what we
might expect to arise out of the discourse of states’ rights rhetoric
applied to regulation of wide swathes of the population. Indeed, racial
segregation throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was also defended on federalism grounds. The ultimate repair for
racial discrimination in that context was Supreme Court recognition
that the claim merited equal protection analysis, followed by substantial federal law concerned with the equality problems caused by segregation and its effects.291 Undoubtedly, immigration regulation is
different from racial segregation, but fundamentally both remind us to
be wary of allowing structural power battles to obscure the racial
antipathy animating parts of subfederal public policy. As such we propose that courts begin to reconsider their avoidance of equality concerns in the several current and upcoming cases presenting
constitutional challenges to state and local immigration laws.292 At a
minimum, more empirical research in this area is warranted.
3. The Future of Immigration Federalism
Despite some indication that many courts view the new immigration federalism as core immigration regulation and emerging evidence
suggesting the propriety of equality-based analysis, it remains unlikely
that federal courts will veer from employing an alienage law framework and preemption methodology in the near future. In their current
mode of judicial analysis, federal courts have considered the constitutionality of several subfederal enactments under a preemption framework, and the Supreme Court has twice, in as many years, done the
290 See Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, No. CV12-02546 PHX DGC, 2013 WL
2128315, at *24 (D. Ariz. May 16, 2013). Note, however, that the trial court nevertheless
denied the motion for preliminary injunction because it found that, although plaintiffs had
shown a likelihood of success on the merits of the claim, they failed to show irreparable
injury and therefore did not meet the standard for preliminary injuction.
291 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 46 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) (prohibiting discrimination in
any program receiving federal assistance).
292 It is worth noting that not every case would be amenable to judicial consideration of
individual liberty claims. For instance, the federal government would likely not have
standing to advance equal protection claims in many cases. However, some cases are
brought by private individuals who would have standing to advance such claims, and in
many cases involving the federal government, courts have consolidated companion cases
involving private plaintiffs. See, e.g., United States v. South Carolina, 840 F. Supp. 2d 898,
904 (D.S.C. 2011) (considering claims by a private party and the federal government
against state immigration law), aff’d, 720 F.3d 518 (4th Cir. 2013).
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same.293 These recent decisions have reduced much of the legal uncertainty surrounding such laws, mostly striking down many of the challenged provisions.294
We conclude this Article by querying how such preemption rulings are likely to affect the future of immigration federalism and what
accounts for the ongoing proposals for state and local immigration
laws. Ultimately, it appears that the recent trend in subfederal immigration policy proliferation has had, and will have, subtle but important effects on our constitutional and political order, regardless of
legal setbacks in recent judicial decisions. As for our research, the
next few years will reveal whether this was an exceptional era in immigration federalism, with our analysis serving as a legal and political
autopsy of the period, or whether future developments will breathe
new life into the politicized model of proliferation we describe.
First, as we noted, while most recent decisions have enjoined subfederal regulatory efforts, a minority of courts have upheld enactments as legitimate exercises of subfederal authority in a federalist
scheme.295 Notably, many decisions that have struck down subfederal
immigration laws have been partial victories. For example, the Court’s
decision in Arizona left section 2 of S.B. 1070 intact for the time
being. In other instances—including in Arizona and in United States v.
Alabama—only portions of the restrictionist laws were even placed
before the respective courts. In these instances, the remaining provisions survived trial court evaluation and remained in force. Many of
the cases, but especially those upholding state and local immigration
measures, reified the empirically suspect notion that these variegated
subfederal policy experimentations address purported threats to local
economies, public safety, and social services.296 More generally, these
293 See United States v. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012); Chamber of Commerce v.
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
294 See Buquer v. City of Indianapolis, No. 1:11-cv-00708-SEB-MJD, 2013 WL 1332158,
at *8–9 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 28, 2013) (halting enforcement of S.B. 1070 “copycat” legislation);
State v. Sarrabea, No. 12-1013, 2013 WL 1810228, at *17 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/1/2013) (preempting statute making it illegal to drive without documentation demonstrating lawful
presence); supra notes 101 & 293 and accompanying text (discussing courts’ preemption
analyses).
295 See, e.g., Keller v. City of Fremont, 719 F.3d 931, 942 (8th Cir. 2013) (finding that a
rental ordinance’s provisions were not preempted by federal law); Gray v. City of Valley
Park, 567 F.3d 976, 977 (8th Cir. 2009) (affirming the district court’s ruling that the city’s
employment ordinance was not preempted by federal law).
296 See supra Part II.B; see, e.g., Gray v. City of Valley Park, No. 4:07CV00881 ERW,
2008 WL 294294, at *25 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2008) (discussing the claim that the city need
only show that there is a rational basis between the ordinance and its purpose and that the
city specifically states in the ordinance that “illegal immigration leads to higher crime rates,
subjects our hospitals to fiscal hardship and . . . contributes to other burdens on public
services, increasing their costs and diminishing their availability, diminishes our overall
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cases reify the propriety of an express or conflict preemption framework within which subfederal immigration enforcement schemes can
sometimes be shielded; as the Eighth Circuit recently iterated (in reasoning and result discordant with a few sister circuits) while upholding
a local rental ordinance:
These related arguments [that illegal alien rental ordinances
are constitutionally preempted or field preempted] are premised on
the notion that the rental provisions impermissibly ‘remove’ a class
of aliens from the City. But the premise is false . . . .
Laws designed to deter, or even prohibit, unlawfully present
aliens from residing within a particular locality are not tantamount
to immigration laws establishing who may enter or remain in the
country.297

Second, neither Arizona nor Whiting completely resolve all the
questions occasioned by the new immigration federalism because subsequent versions of the regulations in question (as created by enacting
jurisdictions) added increasingly punitive features.298 Currently, civil
rights groups are challenging section 2 of S.B. 1070, arguing that this
provision, which was left intact by the Supreme Court, will lead to
racial profiling and harassment.299 In Whiting, the Court expressly
noted that it was only considering the 2007 version of the state EVerify bill, and that the 2008 amendments to the bill were not before
it.300 Those amendments, which expanded the reach of the Legal
Arizona Workers Act (LAWA), could dramatically change judicial
analysis of the law if and when such a challenge reaches the Supreme

quality of life, and endangers the security and safety of the homeland”), aff’d, 567 F.3d 976
(8th Cir. 2009).
297 Keller, 719 F.3d at 941 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that the city’s rental ordinance was
not preempted by federal law and thus declining to enjoin the law).
298 Alabama’s law, for example, contained provisions about the non-enforceability of
contracts entered into by undocumented immigrants, in addition to provisions requiring
undocumented public school students to identify themselves to school officials. H.B. 56,
2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011) (codified in part at ALA. CODE § 31-13 (LexisNexis
2011)). Georgia’s law contained provisions regarding driver’s license violations. GA. CODE
ANN. § 40-5-20 (2013). None of these provisions existed in the Arizona law.
299 The Court left intact section 2 of S.B. 1070, but left open the possibility that litigants
bring a later as-applied challenge to the law if in fact it proved legally problematic in its
execution. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012); Appeals Court Asked
to Block Show-Me-Your-Papers Provision of Arizona Anti-Immigrant Law, ACLU (Sept.
14, 2012), http://www.aclu.org/defending-targets-discrimination/appeals-court-asked-blockshow-me-your-papers-provision-arizona.
300 See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1986–87 & n.10 (2011)
(declining to enjoin the 2007 version of the LAWA, which mandated the use of E-Verify for
businesses within the state).
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Court again.301 The Supreme Court has also not addressed several
other provisions forming the centerpieces of recent litigation that have
thus far reached only the appeals court level, including contracting
provisions,302 rental laws,303 and education-related regulations.304 The
several circuit courts of appeal, in light of Arizona, have mostly
enjoined these attempts, but several important legal questions remain.
The new immigration federalism has thus incrementally explored constitutional limits with each successive turn.305
Finally, the sole presence of federal judicial responses, coupled
with the absence of federal legislative response, matters. First, it augments the narrative of inaction required by Chy Lung, preserving the
political narrative necessary to justify future state and local attempts
at immigration enforcement.306 Second, federal judicial response,
unaccompanied by federal legislation, appears to exert a relatively
diminished deterrent effect on subfederal immigration lawmaking.
Even if subfederal contestation of federal prerogatives can occur in
the shadow of such governing federal law, subfederal entities can
instantiate policy visions and influence national discourse more effectively when they position themselves as filling a gap in federal law
rather than blatantly defying it.307 As Professor CunninghamParmeter notes, “[e]ven though courts have struck down a large
number of [restrictionist state] provisions, state legislation in this area
continues unabated.”308
301 Cf. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, No. 07-3531, 2013 WL 3855549, at *8–9 (3d Cir. July
26, 2013) (enjoining, despite Whiting, Hazleton’s employment verification ordinance on the
basis of its broad scope, which included contractors).
302 See United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1296–97 (11th Cir. 2012) (enjoining
provision of H.B. 56 invalidating contracts entered into by unlawfully present immigrants),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2022 (2013).
303 Compare Keller v. City of Fremont, 719 F.3d 931, 942 (8th Cir. 2013) (upholding
city’s rental ordinance), with Lozano, 2013 WL 3855549 at *8–9 (enjoining city’s rental
ordinance).
304 See Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1236, 1244–50 (11th Cir.
2012) (enjoining provisions of H.B. 56 that required school officials to check the immigration status of students). The Supreme Court has, of course, addressed state attempts to
deny public education to undocumented students in the past. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 223 (1982).
305 See Gerken, supra note 253, at 10 (admitting that the author’s claims “push up
against a conception of national power that is as deeply rooted in sovereignty as is federalism’s conventional conception of state power”).
306 See supra Part II.B.
307 See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 230, at 1271–81 (discussing three types of
uncooperative federalism: licensed dissent, regulatory gaps, and civil disobedience).
Although the authors note that states can effectively contest and dissent from federal
policy in all three circumstances, civil disobedience most clearly positions states in a defiant
role, forcing change through principled resistance.
308 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 22, at 1690.
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Of course, whether the new immigration federalism will have
continued momentum after Arizona and this recent round of federal
judicial responses remains to be seen.309 Although many of the laws
constituting the new immigration federalism have been significantly
limited or wholly struck down by federal courts, elected officials in
enacting jurisdictions are in no worse position than they were prior to
enactment.310 Certainly, state and local officials will have expended
political capital, and not all the jurisdictions’ costs in defending their
policies will be offset by well-funded private interest groups. Nevertheless, data shows that elected officials who supported immigration
laws that were ultimately struck down or severely curtailed reaped
(and still reap) political benefits within their constituencies for having
vocally backed these restrictionist measures.311
Indeed, after the Arizona decision, Governor Jan Brewer, who
signed S.B. 1070 into law, declared victory and vowed to continue

309 See Gulasekaram, supra note 128, at 37 (discussing the renewed spate of local and
state laws impacting the lives of immigrants); Mary Slosson, States Hope to Implement
Immigration Laws After Arizona Ruling, REUTERS (June 27, 2012).
310 See Dianne Solis, Farmers Branch Has Many Waiting for Its Decision on Its Renters
Ordinance Aimed at Illegal Immigration, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 8, 2013, http://
www.dallasnews.com/news/20130808-farmers-branch-has-many-waiting-for-its-decision-onits-renters-ordinance-aimed-at-illegal-immigration.ece (describing financial support for a
contested renters’ ordinance aimed at illegal immigrants); Numbers USA Donates $100,000
to Help Defend Anti-Immigration Ordinance in Farmers Branch, Texas, OFFICIAL BLOGS
FROM THE ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (Sept. 28, 2012), http://blog.adl.org/civil-rights/
numbers-usa-donates-100000-to-help-defend-anti-immigrant-ordinance-in-famers-branchtexas (describing a $100,000 donation supporting the defense of the Farmers Branch ordinance); Sam Galski, Empire Heir Donates $50,000 to Support Hazleton’s Immigration
Battle, REPUBLICAN HERALD, May 10, 2013, http://republicanherald.com/news/empireheir-donates-50-000-to-support-hazleton-s-immigration-battle-1.1486915 (reporting Dallas
real estate heir Trammell S. Crow’s large donation to a fund for the legal defense of
Hazleton’s ordinance). Undoubtedly, these enactments are not costless. Both the legislative process and subsequent legal defenses entail significant costs for these governmental
entities. However, oftentimes, these costs are borne or mitigated by restrictionist advocacy
organizations and wealthy individuals who help fund and provide the legal defense for
these enactments. See About FAIR, FED’N AM. IMMIGR. REFORM, http://www.fairus.org/
about (last visited Aug. 31, 2013); Immigration Reform Law Institute: Litigation, IMMIGR.
REFORM L. INST., http://www.irli.org/litigation (last visited Aug. 31, 2013). Kris Kobach was
a significant contributor to Arizona’s S.B. 1070, and the main author of Alabama’s H.B. 56.
He is currently of counsel with the Immigration Reform Law Institute, the legal wing of
FAIR, and recently represented the city of Fremont in the Keller case. See City of Fremont
Ordinance Upheld, IRLI Wins in the Eighth Circuit, IMMIGR. L. REFORM INST., http://irli.
org/node/80 (last visited Sept. 4, 2013); Margery A. Beck, Federal Panel: Neb. City’s
Immigration Law Legal, A.P. ONLINE (June 28, 2013, 6:24 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/
article/federal-panel-neb-citys-immigration-law-legal-0.
311 See Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, supra note 23, at 1441 (noting that Republican
incumbents face pressure from newcomers with a hard-line stance on immigration).
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pursuing the state’s goal of attrition through enforcement.312 Similarly, the Alabama Attorney General, occupied with the legal challenges to his state’s immigration law, was enthused by the Court’s
Arizona decision, stating: “Today the Supreme Court acknowledged
that state law enforcement can play an important role in assisting the
federal government in fulfilling its responsibility to enforce [federal
immigration law].”313 The very near future should reveal whether
these assertions were merely face-saving bluster or precursors to
future subfederal policymaking. While comprehensive federal immigration reform could potentially help clarify the muddled future of
immigration federalism, our research suggests that our federalist
structure and the politics of immigration will likely forestall a national
legislative response for the immediate future.314
CONCLUSION
Since the turn of the century, and especially in the last seven
years, states and localities have markedly increased their immigration
lawmaking. Contrary to popular conception, however, these laws are
rarely responses to pressing public policy problems. This paper provides an evidence-based reappraisal of this rising phenomenon,
offering a necessary corrective to the flawed political, legal, and theoretical discourse that has dominated the field. We explicate the implications of our findings for existing legal theories of federalism,
including the lack of evidentiary support for functionalist accounts of
subfederal legislation on immigration, and the varying applicability of
legislative cascades and federated party dynamics to restrictive
legislation.

312 Valerie Richardson, Arizona’s AG: Court’s Ruling Is “A 70% Win,” WASH. TIMES
(June 25, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jun/25/arizonas-ag-courtsruling-is-a-70-win/?page=all (quoting Governor Brewer calling the Supreme Court decision a “victory”); Yvonne Wingett Sanchez, Gov. Jan Brewer Claims Victory, AZCENTRAL
(June 25, 2012, 1:47 PM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/politics/articles/20120625arizonaimmigration-law-gov-jan-brewer-claims-victory.html (quoting Governor Brewer stating
that the Supreme Court had upheld the “heart of the law”).
313 Jorge Rivas, Ala. Attorney General Luther Strange Reacts to SCOTUS SB 1070
Ruling, COLORLINES (June 25, 2012, 12:58 PM), http://colorlines.com/archives/2012/06/ala_
attorney_general_luther_strange_responds_to_scotus_sb_1070_ruling.html.
314 See supra Part III.A (arguing that federal lawmakers, especially House members, are
beholden to, and influenced by, subfederal lawmakers and restrictionist policies from their
respective jurisdictions); see also Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, supra note 23, at 1476–83
(detailing federal legislative inaction during Obama’s first term).
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APPENDIX A
We started with a baseline of municipalities (defined as “places”
in most states, but also including “county subdivisions” in others).
Next, we obtained lists of municipalities that have proposed restrictive
ordinances and regulations from various sources, including the
American Civil Liberties Union, LatinoJustice PRLDEF, the Fair
Immigration Reform Movement, the National Immigration Law
Center, and the Migration Policy Institute. We then validated these
lists by making phone calls to jurisdictions noted as considering or
passing ordinances, as well as by monitoring news stories on local
ordinances through December 2011. Still, the data on municipal ordinances become less reliable after 2007, due to a sharp decline in newspaper reports of new municipal ordinances and no further tracking of
municipal legislation by national advocacy groups. We merged information on the proposal and passage of ordinances with demographic
data from the 2000 Census and the 2005–2009 American Community
Survey. Our municipal analysis is presented in Table A below.
Multivariate Regression Analyses
Table A
Logistic Regression Estimations of Municipal Ordinances
Factor

Model I

Model I
(P) Value

Model II

Model II
(P) Value

Republican majority in county

1.381***

[0.335]

1.329***

[0.326]

Naturalized share of citizens

0.004

[0.030]

0.009

[0.022]

Growth of foreign born (2000–2007)
Spanish-dominant households
Agriculture jobs (share)
Share of immigrants who are recent
arrivals

0
0.059***

[0.001]
[0.015]

-0.196*

[0.103]

0.007

[0.007]

0
0.061***
-0.165**
0.007

[0.000]
[0.008]
[0.074]
[0.006]

White poverty rate

-0.024

[0.024]

-0.023

[0.019]

Black poverty rate

-0.004

[0.008]

-0.003

[0.008]

Population (ln)

0.705***

[0.074]

0.673***

[0.060]

Restrictive state policy climate

0.155

[0.110]

0.159

[0.112]

Constant
Observations
Pseudo-R-squared

-12.679***
16,384

[0.822]

-15.070***

[0.699]

16,384
0.17

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, based on two-sided t tests
Significance (p) values in brackets
Note: The number of observations is reduced because of missing data on nativity in cities below
6000 residents. Poverty rates from 2000 census are used because of missing data on black
poverty rates in an additional 7176 cities.
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Model I is a standard logistic regression, which is appropriate for
regressions where outcomes take on binary values of 1 and 0. Logistic
regressions also have the benefit of allowing coefficients to be converted easily to odds ratios.315 Model II is a rare-events logistic regression, using the Relogit statistical software package from http://
gking.harvard.edu/relogit.316 The model weights the sample such that
the weighted ratio of 0s and 1s in the sample matches that of the population, a process designed to correct for selection on the dependent
variable.317

315 See Magdalena Szumilas, Explaining Odds Ratios, 19 J. CAN. ACAD. CHILD
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 227, 227–29 (2010) (“When a logistic regression is calculated,
the regression coefficient (b1) is the estimated increase in the log odds of the outcome per
unit increase in the value of the exposure. In other words, the exponential function of the
regression coefficient (eb1) is the odds ratio associated with a one-unit increase in the
exposure.”).
316 Michael Tomz et al., ReLogit: Rare Events Logistic Regression, GARY KING, http://
gking.harvard.edu/relogit (last visited Aug. 31, 2013).
317 See ReLogit: Rare Events Logistic Regression Package Description, http://www.
stanford.edu/~tomz/software/software.shtml (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).
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APPENDIX B
For Table B, we came up with a measure of state-level legislative
activity on immigrant integration based on reports from the National
Conference of State Legislatures from 2005, 2006, and 2007, and
included any measures that bear a significant relationship to illegal
immigration. Two graduate research assistants were instructed to code
the bills on an ordinal scale of 1: “low impact” and 2: “high impact” on
immigrant rights and/or access to benefits. These categories were
drawn based on the provision’s likely effects on immigrant life
chances and the number of immigrants likely to be affected. Since
these two categories offered a stark distinction, inter-coder reliability
was 94%. In the cases where two codes conflicted, the principal investigator provided the tie-breaking vote. The dependent variable is no
major laws, one major law, and two or more major laws. We model the
results as an ordered logistic regression, which is appropriate when
outcomes take on 3 or more ordinal values.
Table B
Ordered Logistic Regression Estimations of Restrictive State Laws
Enacted, 2005–2010
Factor
Republican share of population

Regression
Estimation

(P)
Value

0.182***

[0.001]

Growth of unauthorized population (2000 to 2007)

-0.009*

[0.061]

Spanish-dominant households

-0.256

[0.198]

0.058

[0.714]

White poverty
Black poverty

0.184**

[0.016]

Agriculture jobs (share of total)

-0.330**

[0.074]

Cut Point 1

13.40

Cut Point 2

15.20

Observations
Pseudo R-squared

50
0.22

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, based on two-sided t
tests
Significance (p) values in brackets
Note: The dependent variable is no major laws, one major law, 2 or more major laws.
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APPENDIX C
Finally, for Table C, we also measured state policies on enforcement and employer mandates, as of January 2012, using a database
from Findlaw.318 Factor analyses revealed that these two measures
represented one underlying factor. We use an Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) estimator, given that the outcome is a continuous (nondichotomous) variable, and present the results as standardized
coefficients.
Table C
OLS Regression Estimations of Restrictive State Policies on
Immigration Enforcement and Work Authorization
Factor
Republican share of population
Growth of unauthorized population (2000 to 2007)
Spanish-dominant households
White poverty

Regression
Estimation

(P)
Value

0.778***

[0.001]

0.112

[0.381]

-0.484

[0.681]

0.089

[0.521]

Black poverty

-0.036

[0.787]

Agriculture jobs (share of total)

-0.670***

[0.001]

Observations
R-squared

50
0.54

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, based on two-sided t
tests
Standardized coefficients, (p) values in brackets

318 Information retrieved on January 12, 2012 from FindLaw, a Thomson Reuters
resource on cases and statutes. State Immigration Laws, FINDLAW, http://immigration.
findlaw.com/immigration-laws-and-resources/state-immigration-laws/.

